

Cultural Aspects of Corruption

Reports from Regional Round Tables in Asia





Cultural Aspects of Corruption

Cultural Aspects of Corruption

Reports from Regional Round Tables in Asia

GTZ GOETHE-INSTITUT This publication is the result of a joined project between the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH and the Goethe-Institut e.V. on the issue "Culture and Development".

Publisher

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH Postfach 5180, 65726 Eschborn http://www.gtz.de Stabsstelle Unternehmensentwicklung/ Ulrike Ebeling

Goethe-Institut e.V.

Dachauer Straße 122

Postfach 19 04 19, 80604 München

http://www.goethe.de

Abteilung Wissen und Gesellschaft/ Robert-Enzio Wetzel

Contact in GTZ

Ulrike Ebeling

Politikberaterin, Stabsstelle Unternehmensentwicklung

E-Mail: Ulrike.Ebeling@gtz.de

Dr. Günter Riethmacher

Country Director, GTZ Office Hanoi E-Mail: Guenter.Riethmacher@gtz.de

Editing

Dr. Peter J. Bumke, Dr. Günter Riethmacher

Layout & Production

Druckreif GmbH & Co. KG, Frankfurt/Main

October 2006

Index

Preface	
Preface to the Regional Round Tables in Asia	9
Jörg Wischermann and Ruth Streicher	
Round Table Bangkok (Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam)	
"Governance, Governance Culture and Corruption	
in Southeast Asia"	11
Changeability of culture and structural causes of corrupti	on1′
Technical or cultural solutions?	13
Good Governance in the shadow of government power	15
Decentralization and corruption	16
Party system, big business and modernization	18
Holy war against corruption?	19
Solutions for a multi-dimensional problem	2
Peter J. Bumke	
Round Table Jakarta (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines)	
"Cultural Aspects of Corruption –	
Case Studies from Southeast Asia"	23
Organization and Proceedings	24
Results	25
1. Azuymardi Azra – Indonesia	25
2. Syed Hussein Alatas – Malaysia	27
3. Waluyo – Indonesia	28
4. Thaveeporn Vasavakul – Thailand	30
5. Heidi Mendoza – Philippines	32
6. Teten Masduki – Indonesia	34
Speakers	
Participants	
Round Table Bangkok	39
Round Table Jakarta	44

Preface

For 30 years GTZ has implemented bilateral international cooperation projects and programmes in the partner countries of German Development Cooperation around the world.

When planning and implementing complex development projects, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH must always take into account the various cultural contexts in which it operates. Considering cultural factors in the partner countries and adapting GTZ consulting services to suit the local cultural circumstances is crucial for the long-term success of development projects. The relationship between a country's culture and its development has been an area of interest for development researchers and practitioners for many years. In terms of technical cooperation, the most significant question is how value-based cooperation with partners abroad can be reconciled with the necessity to align DC activities with local cultures.

With well above one hundred Institutes around the world, Goethe-Institut works together with civil society actors and cultural networks in the field of cultural cooperation. The Goethe-Institut philosophy is reflected in the large number of events that are planned and organised in close collaboration with local partners. An important basis for this fruitful cooperation is the ability to respect each other's cultures without losing sight of one's own values.

In the age of globalisation, unrelenting technological progress and boundless mobility of capital, developing and emerging countries are facing major challenges. Much controversy surrounds the question of whether economic and political modernisation and liberalisation are helping democracy and a Western-style market economy to become prevalent in all parts of the world, or rather whether the diversity of social cultures and systems is in fact a result of globalisation. Many developing and emerging countries are concerned that increasing globalisation will obscure their own identities. There is a growing call for a return to one's own culture and values which may be interpreted, also within Europe, as a response to a removal of boundaries that has come too quickly. Intercultural dialogue can only gain depth and GTZ and Goethe-Institut projects can only have the desired effect if certain crucial prerequisites for successful cooperation are recognised and respected.

Experience has shown that a lack of knowledge and comprehension of foreign cultures and values is one of the main reasons why projects and programmes fail. A decisive factor for successful cooperation between German organisations working in the field of foreign cultural and education policy and development cooperation on the one hand, and their partners in the host and partner countries on the other, is an improvement in the intercultural competence of actors on both sides. Besides knowledge of and respect for the other side's values and attitudes, this includes developing an awareness of one's own culture and values.

The Culture and Development cooperation project is GTZ and Goethe-Institut's response to the above challenges. Various perspectives, experiences and approaches are being shared and new approaches developed in order to identify how activities in the partner countries can be made even more effective.

The cooperation between GTZ and Goethe-Institut in an area that is highly significant for both organisations is an excellent opportunity to explore the prerequisites and frameworks for joint initiatives, share the knowledge and experience available on both sides, and leverage the results of the cooperation for both organisations' future activities.

Dr. Bernd Eisenblätte Managing Director

GTZ

Dr. Hans-Georg Knopp Secretary General

Ham. for lugar.

Goethe-Institut

Preface to the Regional Round Tables in Asia

Goethe-Institut and GTZ launched a series of joint events, referred to as regional Round Tables on Culture and Development, to take account of the expectations of partners in the host and partner countries concerning extensive cooperation in all relevant areas of society, specifically the use of local expertise, local commitment and local creativity. During the Round Tables the organisers reviewed their approaches in the light of those pursued by local partners. The first Round Table took place in Berlin in April 2005. Others followed in Chile (October 2005), Asia (Thailand/Viet Nam and Indonesia in spring 2006), and South Africa (April 2006), with the series ending in Morocco in September 2006.

The present publication contains summary reports on the Round Tables in Bangkok/Hanoi and Jakarta. Both events focused on corruption, one of the greatest obstacles to development in the region, and were attended by academics and politicians from Viet Nam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. They discussed to what extent corruption, besides its obvious political, economic and legal causes, can be seen as a specifically cultural phenomenon and how it influences the region's cultures.

The Round Table originally to take place in Hanoi was moved to Bangkok for political reasons. Against the background of the crisis involving the Thaksin administration at that point the presence of Auditor General Khunying Jaruwan Maintaka, who had just been reinstalled in office by the King of Thailand, caused a considerable stir in the media.

In the run-up to the Round Table in Jakarta, the well-known Indonesian documentary filmmaker Lexy Rambedeta had spent several months researching everyday corruption in Indonesia. A DVD copy of his film is enclosed with this publication.

We thank Jürgen Koch, Country Director of GTZ Thailand and his staff, for the logistical and organizational help in preparing and implementing the Round Table in Bangkok.

Dr. Günter W. Riethmacher

Country Director GTZ Hanoi Dr. Peter J. Bumke

Regional Director for SE Asia Goethe-Institut Jakarta

Jörg Wischermann and Ruth Streicher

Round Table Bangkok (Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam)

"Governance, Governance Culture and Corruption in Southeast Asia"

3. - 4. March 2006Davis Hotel, Bangkok

Corruption as a link between culture and development - this topic was to be discussed in the round table "Governance, Governance Culture and Corruption in Southeast Asia". 25 experts on science, society, government and NGOs from Viet Nam, Thailand and Indonesia were invited to Bangkok. The two-day conference was the third part of a world-wide series of meetings concerning "culture and development", which was organized by the German Agency for Technical Co-operation (GTZ) and the Goethe Institute. Apart from the focus on corruption, the perspective of regional comparison was the key point of the conference.

Changeability of culture and structural causes of corruption the theoretical basis for discussion

Dr. Jörg Wischermann's concept paper establishes the theoretical connection between corruption, culture and development. The paper served as the analytical framework and discussion basis for the round table. In the center of the theoretical discussion, culture is understood as a component of a wide-reaching network of relationships (which is formed by different factors such as gender, groups, social classes, etc.) According to the paper, culture can be seen as a field of different and disputed interpretations, which would be subject to a dynamic social negotiation process. Culture can not be

defined as fixed, or completed. It is not something to be defined firmly and definitively with more or less constant sizes and components such as values and standards. Culture is rather a process and "work in progress" (Hannerz), a constantly changing and changeable principal of disputed attributions, or, as expressed by the Indian Anthropologist Arjun Appadurai: "Culture is a dialogue between aspiration and sedimented tradition".

According to Mr. Wischermann's paper, political institutions and structures are "culturally embedded" and to be understood as "sedimented samples of interpretation". In this social-constructionalistic understanding, they would have a function of mediation of meaning and orientation, at least they indirectly framed and steered actions of protagonists. As a result of this interpretation, institutions do not function based just on rule setting and accepting of norms and values, but also particularly based on interaction and communication. According to Mr. Jan Folke Schuppert, a Berlin sociologist and lawyer, this communication works because members of the collective have common interpretations and conceptions, which serve as "public codes" of the common communication.

According to this interpretation, neither institutions nor culture represent unchangeable extents or culturally typical constants. The paper underlines the continuous changes and changeability of institutions and social organizations. In other words, governance and governance culture is, like culture in general, "continuously changing". Therefore, a practical conclusion is that the corrupt culture of a government and organization can be changed just like culture. The battle to change certain forms of governance and governance culture is, however, always a kind of cultural fight over different (socially disputed) cultural interpretations.

Despite a close link between culture, corruption and development, Mr. Wischermann stressed that the roots of "corruption culture" were to be searched for primarily in political-economic structures, but not in differently developed cultures. His paper is explicitly against a "culturalistic" interpretation of corruption. As a result, it made the suggestion to the round table to not only compare the corruption phenomenon in Viet Nam, Indonesia and Thailand, but also to discuss concrete measures against corruption.

Dr. Guenter Riethmacher, country director of GTZ in Vietnam acted as chairman of the first workshop. In his opening speech he pointed out that GTZ assists it's partners worldwide in all aspects of sustainable development. Corruption counteracts development efforts and therefore a throughout analysis in all areas of society is needed. Regional and global comparison of the phenomenon will help to find promising approaches for local conditions. For this GTZ uses it's global Knowledge Management System.

Mr. Wilfried Eckstein, director of the Goethe Institute in Thailand, also stressed the importance of the dialogue about corruption with Asian partners. In his opening speech he described typical cases of corruption in Germany and emphasized the omnipresence of corruption beyond cultural borders. In order to illustrate the fight against corruption as the common goal of all participants, Mr. Eckstein closed his speech by saying "We all sit in one boat and want to go in the same direction".

Technical or cultural solutions? Perception and roots of corruption in Viet Nam

In the first lecture of the meeting, Professor Dr. Nguyen Dinh Cu presented detailed results concerning corruption in Viet Nam.

In a widely conducted survey in 2005, over 5000 officials, employees in enterprises and citizens had been asked about their subjective perception on corruption and its causes in Viet Nam. According to the study, most interviewees considered structural factors largely influential on corruption. Most of them also agreed that a lack of national regulation favours corruption. In addition, the interviewees stated that bad personnel management and missing control mechanisms were at the roots of corruption in Viet Nam.

In the following discussion, Professor Dr. Kasian Tejapira asked that the implications of the factors presented by Mr. Nguyen would be discussed in each of the three countries represented.

Asked about the specific factors in Viet Nam, Mr. Nguyen stated the importance of the "asking and giving" mechanism, which is rooted deeply in the culture of the country. It is still very common in modern day Viet Nam to provide national institutions with small gifts in order to win contracts. This should help accelerate decisions and administrative processes. Foreign investors, when they considered starting economic activities in Vietnam, were put off by such opaque mechanisms. Additionally, corruption frequently occurs in Viet Nam in the form of false privatisation of national treasure.

Dr. Thaveeporn Vasavakul pointed out that the specific character of the political system of Viet Nam, which is the one-party system, and the autocracy of the communist party, must not be ignored as primary factors in corruption. A certain "government culture" has created conditions favouring the corruption.

Moreover, apart from the political characteristics mentioned above, family and friend networks are of great importance in Viet Nam, also in political institutions. They have caused the blurring of private and public interests. The increasing rate of corruption in Viet Nam can be explained by the fact that people are more aware of the problem, and the understanding of corruption has changed. Corruption is increasingly being regarded as illegitimate.

Professor Dr. Le Dang Doanh stressed the political-structural aspect of corruption, but not only in Viet Nam. It is the abuse of power and influence, and therefore it can only be fought by establishing and applying institutional and other counterweights.

Already in the first discussion round, the question about technical and cultural solutions for corruption came up. Addressing it, Mr. Vasavakul pointed out that the lecture from Viet Nam focused on administrative and legal, rather, technical solutions for the fight against corruption. She doubted that such measures alone could effectively fight the problem of corruption.

Taking Vietnam as an example, the potentially positive role of the (free) press and investigative journalism in fighting corruption was discussed. In this context, Mr. Nguyen pointed out that the Vietnamese press (still under

state regulations) held the market economy to be responsible for rising corruption in Viet Nam.

Good Governance in the shadow of government power – a real-life report from Thailand

In the subsequent lecture, Mrs. Khunying Jaruvan Maintaka illustrated the importance of a free press in fighting corruption in Thailand. Her presentation showed political caricatures in the Thai press from the last years.

Mrs. Jaruvan Maintaka, whose work can be compared with that of the highest auditor of Thailand, had been represented in these caricatures, among other things, as a witch, getting her claws into the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Since he and other powerful politicians wanted to prevent her work, Mrs. Jaruvan Maintaka was suspended for more than a year from the office. Shortly before the conference, she was able to resume her work. King Bumiphol refused to place her successor into the office, whereupon he gave up the position.

Mrs. Jaruvan Maintaka reported on the most important problems of her work, especially, mega-projects of the government which are never run without corruption. For example, contracts were given to enterprises, whose bosses are friends of government's authorities. In such cases, public bidding would not take place. The prices of such orders are frequently way above the usual market prices.

Such cases of obvious corruption can be observed, for example, in the construction of the new airport in Bangkok. Corruption is often a co-operation among politicians, businessmen and government officials. They all profit from it, but not the tax payers, the highest Thai auditor stressed.

Besides many examples of "bad governance", Mrs. Jaruvan Maintaka also spoke about "good governance". According to her, it is a professional management system, an efficient control system and a system in which all involved parties in a project regularly report on the current status of the project. Mrs. Jaruvan Maintaka is aware of her role in the Thai public and wants

to raise awareness of the most important values of "good governance": accountability, responsibility and transparency. In her opinion, these values should be given to young school children through education.

After Mrs. Jaruvan Maintaka's presentation, Dr. Peter Bumke, Regional Director of the Goethe Institute in Jakarta, made the remark that although culturally Indonesia and Thailand were very different, they are obviously quite similar in regards to corrupt practices. He then raised the question to experts: "To what extent can culture be seen as the crucial factor for analysing corruption?"

According to Professor Dr. Kasian Tejapira, major differences between different countries are to be considered. In Thailand, a connection between national power and big business currently exists on a scale larger than anytime in the past. Therefore, the corruption scandals are severe. The constitutional monarchy is a specific factor, which should be taken into consideration in the fight against corruption. Moreover, in Thailand there is a non-parliamentary movement fighting against corruption. Such a movement is not yet to be seen in Viet Nam.

Dr. Michael Nelson warned against overrating the power of the civiliansocial movement regarding fighting corruption in Thailand. He pointed out that Mrs. Jaruvan Maintaka could continue to keep her office only thanks to royal intervention (or non-interference). Mr. Bumke stated that, nevertheless, public participation in anti-corruption activities should not be underestimated. In Indonesia, the fight against corruption is difficult, because corruption is still accepted by the local people.

Decentralization and corruption - experiences on the local level in Indonesia

The last presentation on the first day was given by Mr. Gamawan Fauzi, Governor of the province of West Sumatra (Indonesia), which reported on corruption and culture from the point of view of Indonesian government practice. In his lecture, he expressed that corruption was not a part of Indo-

nesian culture. A proof is that despite, or because of his anti-corruption measures as a governor, he had still been re-elected.

Mr. Fauzi followed by noting that factors like the lack of will for the fight against corruption, insufficient salary of the officials, bad economic conditions and inefficient control systems favour corruption in Indonesia. Besides, it is undeniable that since the development of the modern state, the borders between traditional cultural practices (like the delivery of gifts as indications of respect) and corrupt practices are blurred. According to the Governor of the province of West Sumatra, in order to fight against corruption in Indonesia in a sustainable way, structural conditions, as well as sufficient payment of government officials, should be created.

This lecture from the local Indonesian government authority directed the attention of the participants to the topic of "corruption on the local governmental level". Mr. Vasavakul raised the question of "how must decentralization look like, which one is suitable for fighting against corruption on the local level?" And "which organizational measures would be used to fight effectively against corruption on communal and provincial levels?" In Viet Nam, decentralization measures, which were introduced in the 90's, would have strengthened corruption on the local level, she explained as the background to her question.

Based on the Indonesian example, Mr. Fauzi referred to the role of the press in fighting corruption. Over fifty members of the local parliament in West Sumatra were arrested because they had been involved in a corruption scandal, which was discovered by a journalist. Such a drastic act against corrupt politicians had never taken place before, according to Mr. Fauzi. Moreover, three governors were arrested under suspicion of corruption, reported the governor. Thus, he praised the anti-corruption efforts of the Indonesian government.

Party system, big business and modernization - comparing interim results of the first day

To conclude the first day, participants tried to analyze the basic conditions of corruption in a comparison between Thailand, Indonesia and Viet Nam. The one-party system was laid out as characteristic of Viet Nam. The fight against corruption in the government machinery must therefore be led also by the communist party. However, the communist party of Viet Nam is a highly fragmented political organization, which is by no means a monolithic unit.

Additionally, Mr. Fauzi compared a type of corruption observed in the Indonesian election campaign with the common practice of buying votes in Thailand. On a local basis, in Thailand, entrepreneurs were frequently selected. They invested first in purchasing votes and then used the political power to increase their private economic profit. Thus, corruption could be also interpreted as the dark side of democracy.

The connection between political power and big business was seen as a similarity between Viet Nam and Thailand. However there is a substantial difference: in Thailand, it is the connection of national power and private capital. In Viet Nam, it is the connection of national power and capital, which is at least formally in the possession of the state.

Moreover, Western modernization is a factor which can not be ignored in all three countries when analysing corruption. In this regard, a thesis was presented that corruption had only developed with the introduction of money and collection of taxes.

The last contribution to the discussion referred again to the problematic connection of decentralization and corruption. It is important to inform people in rural areas about corruption and to establish a favourable mood for anti-corruption measures. On the local level, monitoring mechanisms suitable to prevent that decentralization favours corruption should be set up as well. Last but not least, the fight against corruption depends on the participation of the local people.

Holy war against corruption? Anti-corruption culture in Indonesia

Using the short formula "KKN" (Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme - in English: Corruption, Darkening, Nepotism), Professor Dr. Bambang Pranowo, the first speaker on the second day, talked about the conditions of his homeland, Indonesia. Mr. Pranowo, quoting Mohammed Hatta, the former vice-president of Indonesia, said, "corruption had become meanwhile part of the Indonesian culture".

In contrast, Mr. Pranowo was of the opinion that corruption practices are not rooted in the culture. Moreover, corruption hurts both cultural and religious norms in Indonesia. Therefore it is necessary to call out a "holy war against corruption". Mr. Pranowo praised the anti-corruption efforts of governments, which had come after president Suhartos' fall. In particular, the acting president Dr. Bambang Yudhoyono, stands for an effective fight against corruption in Indonesia. But despite these efforts, it was not successful to cope with Indonesian conditions of "KKN", therefore, it is now necessary to raise anti-corruption sentiment of the population with the help of a "holy war".

The experts articulated criticism against Mr. Pranowos' proclamation of a "holy war". A holy war against corruption implies force and violence against private people without respect to the constitutional norms and procedures. This could lead to violent incidents as seen in the war against drugs and drug bosses in Thailand in the years 2003 - 2004.

During this period, police and military would have killed more than 2500 humans without constitutional procedures. If one wanted to strengthen the constitutional state in Indonesia, then one should not call for a war against right violators. Corruption is still a violation of legal standards and regulations and not a threat to national security. Therefore, military intervention and the use of indiscriminate force without any constitutional basis against illegally acting private citizens are not to be legitimized under any circumstances.

Other participants supported Mr. Pranowos's suggestion, stating that the term "holy war" had only been symbolically used and the reference to "jihad" needs to be seen in the Indonesian context. There, it is quite normal to use the expression "holy war" in order to mobilize humans for a fair cause.

A "holy war" means first of all, on the intellectual level, to fight for peace, equality and justice. It excludes aggressive acts of violence. In addition, Mr. Pranowo argued, the expression "holy war" actually emphasizes only the seriousness and the importance of the fight against corruption. Vietnamese participants regretted that there is no comparable term in the Vietnamese language.

In addition, Mr. Pranowo was criticized for his view that corruption stands completely outside of the Indonesian culture. It is undeniable that in Indonesia practices of corruption have mixed themselves with cultural practices. If corruption is defined as something outside of culture, it would be easier to make outsiders responsible for corruption, instead of looking into its roots.

Professor Dr. Nguyen Dinh Cu compared Viet Nam, Indonesia and Thailand in regards to population structure. In all three countries, there is still a large number of people living in rural areas. Therefore, in these countries culture and tradition are rooted in the country-side life. An aspect of the life in the country side is a certain "casualness" in dealing with other people, which can sometimes favour corruption. This is a clear overlap of culture and corruption, Mr. Nguyen stressed.

Professor Dr. Le Dang Doanh noted that "who searches definitions of culture in internet, will find hundreds of different definitions. Most of them have however a common point. Human relations and interaction always relate to culture". He continued, "that's why corruption is also part of culture". However, from this theoretical basis, he concluded positively: 'If culture is changeable, corruption culture is then changeable as well. It depends therefore how to create an anti-corruption culture'.

Solutions for a multi-dimensional problem - culture, corruption and development in the final discussion

In the final discussion, corruption, which is seen as a connection between culture and development, was put into relation to the development of the modern state. From this point of view, Professor Kasian Tejapira said that corruption could be considered as a local resistance against nationally imposed state structures. Also a specific definition of corruption as well as an appropriate awareness in the population developed only with the development of the modern state.

Dr. Gerhard Will was of the opinion that corruption can be gotten under control, but not totally abolished. Whenever economic power is in private hands, people will try to influence politically legitimized power in order to establish advantages and get more room to manoeuvre. Therefore a state without corruption is only conceivable if all economic resources were strictly controlled and private property is not allowed. On the other hand, the legitimacy and legal capacity of the state depends largely on how decisively the fight against corruption and against other crimes is carried out. Vital for the success of a political system is that it is based on mutual control and on competition for political power.

Professor Dr. Bui The Cuong stressed the important role of elites with high leadership quality in the fight against corruption. He was criticized in that elites do not by default develop good leadership qualities and their activities do not automatically produce positive effects on corruption. On the contrary, the history of European, as well as of Southeast Asian countries has shown many examples of corrupt elites. Mr. Bui specified his argument and stressed the importance of development of political structures, which would be suitable to prevent such negative developments and bring up positive leadership qualities.

Education is referred to by experts as an important means to fight against corruption. Children should be educated on moral values starting with the first school years, which will keep them from later corrupt behaviour.

Therefore it is very important to train teachers on this matter and provide appropriate school materials. According to Mr. Vasavakul, it is problematic to realize such suggestions, as an education supporting certain values and standards could be understood by local people as an attack on their own cultural conceptions. Accordingly, such suggestions are more difficult to accept and implement than the so-called technical solutions, which particularly contain the introduction of modern national institutions and regulation mechanisms.

There was an unanimous opinion that there is no simple solution due to the multi-dimensional condition of corruption. So it is very important to engage different social groups in the fight against corruption. Furthermore, the experts agreed that in all three countries, there is still a large need for empirical research on corruption. Concerning this matter, Dr. Michael Nelson suggested a somewhat different research approach: Instead of always asking who when why corrupts, the reasons for incorruptible behavior should be investigated.

The participants seemed to be pleased with the discussions and the results of the conference and suggested the next round table for this or a related topic to be organized in one or two years. It was also suggested to promote exchanges between the experts by internet until the next discussion.

Round Table Jakarta (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines) "Cultural Aspects of Corruption – Case Studies from Southeast Asia"

25. - 26. April 2006 GoetheHaus, Jakarta

The round table "Culture and Development" organized in Jakarta in April 2006 by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the Goethe Institute, attempted to shed light on the relationship between "Culture and Development" by focusing on the topic of corruption.

In almost all countries of South-East Asia corruption is seen as probably the most entrenched barrier to development. It thwarts all attempts, both from abroad and from inside at democratization and structural adjustment toward a more rationally functioning bureaucracy, an adequate legal end educational system as well as a secure climate for investment; it distorts or destroys the effect of a multitude of measures.

The public discourse on the phenomenon corruption takes place in a somewhat contradictory fashion, between value laden rejection and the simultaneous endemic spread of corrupt practices in most countries of the region. That discourse leaves out the real socioeconomic and cultural mechanisms that underpin corruption as an alternative mode of resource distribution, making it so ineradicable. It leaves out also the widespread – if rarely explicit – acceptance and value dissonance, without which corruption as a complex and over-determined societal phenomenon would hardly be as enduring.

The comparative analytical (and documentary) view on "the culture of corruption" was supposed to lead to new findings about a widely discussed but insufficiently understood societal phenomenon and make the available but complex attempts at explanation accessible to a wider public, first in Jakarta and later in Germany. At the same time the comparison of different experiences from different countries and the resulting different perspectives were to lead to sober and relevant observations.

By attempting to decode the cultural dimensions and aspects of corruption together with regional experts we did not proceed from the assumption that corruption was somehow culturally specific to the region. The title "The Culture of Corruption" was intended to highlight the perspective that corruption in its totality should be seen as a cultural phenomenon sui generis, whose more visible economic, political and legal aspects are all more or less culturally impregnated.

The following questions were to be addressed and dealt with:

- the nature of contracts and the reciprocity of corrupt agreements
- the significance of personal networks and clients "above" the level of the family and "below" that of the state
- sectors and social areas particularly prone to corruption
- corruption as a "way of life" or "fact of life"
- bad conscience, grey zones, justifications, value criteria
- historical antecedents, the significance of the colonial heritage

Organization and Proceedings

In good time for the round table a documentary, commissioned by the Goethe Institute, was finished by the Indonesian filmmaker Lexy Rambadeta, about day to day corruption, its underlying motivations and experiences with corruption in Indonesia. The film "Faces of Everyday Corruption in Indonesia" was shown and discussed during the public session of the program.

The round table itself took place over $1 \frac{1}{2}$ days and consisted of a round of experts and a final presentation of the results and findings in front of a larger audience in the GoetheHaus Jakarta on 16 April 2006.

Results

In accordance with the subject matter the six presentations touched three topics with differing intensity:

- empirical case studies of several South-East Asian countries which highlighted the linkages between the political, economic and legal conditions of corruption on the one side and the socio-cultural conditions on the other
- a more detailed definition of these basic socio-cultural conditions and the value-dispositions underlying them
- a delineation of consequences for the fighting of corruption following from these cultural factors

1.

In his opening presentation the dean of the Islamic University Jakarta Prof. Azyumardi Azra called corruption the gravest and most acute problem of Indonesia, posing the greatest challenge for all efforts at good governance. In a bow toward the doyen of corruption research in South East Asia Prof. Syed Hussein Alatas he commenced with a brief overview of current definitions of corruption. At the same time he stressed that in Indonesia the term corruption had no precise definition but was used in public discourse in a vein with other socially harmful activities such as fraud, cartelization, obstruction of punishment and nepotism under the acronym KKN (korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme). (This undefined usage of the term corruption in Indonesian day to day life also shows up in the interviews of the documentary by Lexy Rambadeta).

According to Prof. Azra, while previously it was mainly the lack of political will to fight corruption from above actively and effectively, it had become clear that under the current government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono the now existing political will was no longer sufficient. Especially in parliament, but also in the bureaucracy pertinent initiatives were frustrated time and again. The efforts of the two largest Muslim organizations of the country Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiya (both with ca. 35-40 million members) had also proved largely ineffective.

On this backdrop Prof. Azra turned to the cultural factors that are crucial for the flourishing of this endemic corruption: A system of patronageclientele-relationships deeply anchored in all social spheres that caused an impenetrable net of mutual dependencies and benefits especially in the relationship between the political and administrative elites, functioning as patrons and the business world that attempts to increase its chances in the market by offering bribes. This had the effect of not only endangering or annulling compliance with official regulations but it was also causing massive market distortions. Clientilistic systems of this nature were characteristic for "soft" or in Max Weber's terminology "patrimonial" political systems. This clientilistic system was significantly strengthened in the case of Indonesia by the fact, that even though corruption was condemned in public discourse, other forms of providing gifts that can only with difficulty be distinguished from corruption were traditionally valued very highly, especially in rural areas. In this "culture of giving" a transfer of money or in kind to a patron would seem - depending on the point of view - as either a voluntary donation or as an extorted payment without which governmental services starting with the issue of a driving license to the provision of health care were de facto not to be had.

On top of that corruption appeared not only in the socially legitimizing guise of the gift but this vagueness continued with the recipients, especially with the religious organizations and their schools. That religious leaders received gifts was widely accepted even if there was uncertainty whether they accepted them for their institution or as personal gifts. This uncertainty had caused the downfall of President Abdurrahman Wahid ("Gus Dur") who had pocketed a US\$ 5 million donation by the Sultan of Brunai.

Even though there was a religious sanctioning of corruption – President SBY had called on the religious organizations for corresponding appeals – corruption was not forbidden (haram) as vehemently and unambiguously as for example the consumption of pork. Finishing up Prof. Azra turned toward conceivable measures with a possible effect on these cultural dispositions: without an effective legal sanctioning , added to that a more widespread public awareness, a more active role of NGOs and the Press as well as greater efforts in public education the fight against corruption, that Hatta

had already in the beginning of the 50s called part of Indonesian culture, could not be won.

2.

Prof. Dr. Syed Hussein Alatas, since his first sociological publications (The sociology of Corruption (1968)) known as a foremost authority on corruption in South East Asia picked up on these positions and objected to some: instead of talking about a "culture of corruption", which would be rather meaningless one should talk about the "corruption of culture". Corruption should be understood as a phenomenon that has been around for millennia but was still only incompletely recognized. Corruption caused damage far beyond the merely material transactions, for it essentially threatened the dignity and freedom of people; it should be seen as a product of evil and an anthropologically anchored striving for power.

A newly acute sense and moral understanding of corruption was thus necessary and also possible. This perusal of strict moral standards would allow participants to continue to distinguish between traditional gifts and donations and forcibly extracted handovers. As regards corruption traditional societies in history and contemporary village communities had clear moral guidelines that had nothing to do with the perversion toward nepotism: helping ones own kin should not come at the expense of others.

On the other hand many societies in Asia and Africa were in the hands of dominant, rapacious elites that were plundering their own countries. One would first have to get rid of them, as happened in Europe.

The newly discovered attention toward the phenomenon of corruption such as shown by the World Bank or Transparency International (TI) Prof. Alatas interpreted as the result of a spreading "ideology of corruption", that under the pretext of trying to explain it, actually justifies it. Only in the 50s, people went as far as understanding corruption as an engine of growth and besides the current denunciations were paternalistic: how could the West dare to tell countries in the Third world how to stay clean?

The indices of TI also did not get to the heart of the matter, for not transparency was the central problem but integrity. "Integrity without Transpar-

ency" should be valued above "Transparency without Integrity". The latter was already amply available, since most problems came into the open, for example the correlation between illegal and environmentally damaging logging in tropical forests or most immoral political decisions.

Of course, a certain transparency could help morality, but it had to follow its own guideline, even when judging and analyzing seemingly pure economic and political circumstances. No theory of the labor market could work without implicit moral assumptions.

Integrity could be propagated only with difficulty, Prof. Alatas conceded in the discussion. Corruption was a specific type of behavior that one could study, analyze and evaluate. Integrity however was a quality of behavior, not an object around which one could build institutions.

Historically the quality of political leadership was crucial in determining the rise and fall of civilizations and the spread of corruption. Beyond all "factual" elements of development it were always certain actors that charted the course of history. Their appearance or their absence was however not predictable. "To learn from history is a bit like traveling at night – one continues to walk in the dark."

As a further factor that could diminish corruption – lying between general moral standards and the rare exemplary political leadership – Prof . Alatas highlighted the emergence of political strata that thought and acted beyond their immediate interests, for which there were however few credible examples after the first few during the time of the independence movements.

3.

The historical shift from traditionally and culturally accepted to the modern problematic, as was alluded to in the previous presentations, was picked up on by the next speaker, Waluyo, deputy chairman of the governmental anti-corruption agency, KPK, as starting point for an eminently practical discussion of the problems facing the fight against corruption.

Of the four strategic foci of the anti-corruption agency – repression, prevention, strengthening of institutions and participation of the public – the last

one was the one most strongly imbued culturally. Especially the widespread acceptance of behavior that should be classified before the law as corruption made it hard for the KPF:

- Kickbacks for administration contracts to private businesses were not only common, many participants, such as students asked by Waluyo, lacked any sense of awareness of illegality or guilty conscience.
- Waluyo recounts a telling story: a mother sends her son who
 proudly returned home with an ID-card that he managed to get
 without paying a bribe immediately back to the civil servant
 with an envelope containing cash so that he may not use a later
 opportunity for pay back
- Payments from the private sector to notoriously badly paid civil servants for their services are generally accepted

The KPK was using the good part of its resources for the development of information campaigns for the formal and informal education sectors in order to promote a negative social image of corrupt practices. It were good, if there were clear statements on this matter by Islamic scholars.

But it was hoped that it was possible to positively influence, i.e. lower the corruption indices that are based on public awareness in the next years. It is has been shown that apart from the two relatively small minorities at the extremes – people that remain integer under all circumstances and those that are never prepared to behave integrally – more than half of the population made their behavior and their value judgments dependent more on concrete circumstances then principles.

In the discussion it was generally acknowledged, that day to day corruption of a smaller scale was not only widespread in Indonesia but was also widely accepted. But it remained to be asked, why the KPK did not concentrate its main attention on the really serious cases of corruption involving bureaucracy and private businesses, where according to estimates 40-50% of the governmental budget was trickling away. Apart from a few spectacular cases such as that of the governmental election commission KPU, when which some previously respectable academics had received large kickbacks, with-

out having beforehand sought political assurances, few higher ranking civil servants or politicians are ever prosecuted.

In the same context it remained to be asked, why the by any measure rare criminal proceedings that were anyhow following political opportunities, were de facto resolved to passive bribery in Indonesia. Active bribery by Corporate Houses on a larger scale remained generally not prosecuted, even though the law had registered and was aware of these crimes.

Finishing up Waluyo mentioned once more that without effective prosecution any public information campaign remained relatively ineffective. Whether certain behavior was classified as corrupt under cultural aspects was in the end less relevant than the fact whether this behavior had legal consequences. A corresponding societal pressure and public sanctions could however also be important.

4.

Dr. Thaveeporn Vasakul, a Vietnam specialist from Thailand presented a brief and thorough political and economic analysis of the preconditions for the rise of corruption in Vietnam in the last 20 years and the reasons why the topic had gained such virulence in the last years.

Based on a multitude of newspaper cuttings the starting point of her analysis was that the Socialist Republic Vietnam was not only not immune against the evil of corruption but that a homegrown conflict-laden constellation between a liberalizing economy (doi moi) and ongoing central control by the party hierarchy was in fact creating corruption systematically and increasingly on a grand scale.

The "illegal privatization" of state power could take any of three forms:

- Kickbacks for public services
- the abuse of authority for private benefit in the course of privatizing state assets
- Handover of state prerogatives to private, often criminal circles as happened in the Nam-Cam banking scandal that had been

uncovered in HCMC (Saigon) in 2001, when it was discovered that a large number of policemen and political cadres were on the payroll of mafia like organizations

To explain this massive incidence of corruption that creates a significant legitimacy deficit for the communist party of Vietnam, Thaveeporn found three factors functioning in a complex relationship:

- The lack of a clear und unambiguous legal framework for the interaction of state and private sector
- Remnants of the old central planning economy guaranteeing privileged access to civil servants and cadres to economic resources
- The interaction between the various cultural traits of Vietnam: the importance of personal social networks and of reciprocity, the role of political patronage under the auspices of a socialist oriented market economy and a governance culture still dominated by the persistent one party rule

The significance of these cultural factors was partly caused by the weakness and lack of legal arrangements; they were thus filling a void and had turned corruption in Vietnam into an omnipresent collective enterprise.

In fact in the recent past there had been determined attempts to limit the blatant economic and political damage caused by the increased corruption and to formulate pertinent legal measures. But this had caused a conflict between the "rule of law", which partly had to be created from scratch and the "rule of social relations" of the new culture of the market economy and the political culture of a one party state. The widespread condemnation of corruption but especially the fact that this remained without consequences was the result of conflicting legal cultures..

In finishing up Thevaaporn turned to a comparative perspective of the South East Asian neighbors and identified three sets of critical variables:

 The role of the state in the economy – relatively strong in Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar, less so in Thailand and the Philip-

- pines, where corruption was practiced more by elected politicians
- Corruption had an economic as well as a cultural component.
 Ambiguous and missing legal frameworks caused civil servants to improvise and charge "transaction costs". Corruption would persist as long as it was accepted within certain cultural parameters. Anti-corruption measures usually sprang into existence when the transaction costs had become prohibitive for one side
- The role of the state and different cultural values posed the following questions:
- Who are the organizers of anti-corruption campaigns (the state or NGOs, one or more organizations?
- Is the population included in the fight against corruption and how decentralized is it
- How are solutions formulated? Are they predominantly technical or predominantly socio-cultural?

In the resulting discussion two more examples of the transaction costs of corruption in Vietnam were mentioned: the apparently still comparatively small kickback sums for foreign investors that so far seem not to have deterred them. The potentially destabilizing effect of corruption but also of anti-corruption campaigns on the party, whose own stability took priority over anything else, created a real dilemma in Vietnam. Every country invariably had to find its own mixture of political and legal as well as cultural changes.

5.

The Philippine example of Heidi Mendoza a specialist for investigative auditing with strong experience within and outside the Philippine administer tion, seamlessly followed on the last remarks: after a demonstration of a number of concrete examples of kickbacks and commissions, bogus transactions and conversions, document forgeries and official-private accounts, of

rackets and attempts to cover tracks, all taken from within the radius of the military, she attempted to isolate the structures that she noticed.

While existing regulations were seemingly followed and great efforts invested in keeping up that appearance, the spirit and content of these regulations was constantly violated. The almost complete lack of a sense of the common good, added to that serious conflicts of loyalty vis-à-vis superiors, the army as a whole, or even the nation; personal interests a strong esprit de corps and hierarchical social structures made the military extremely vulnerable to corrupt practices, to fight which no effective mechanisms of control were available both within and outside the military. On top of that officers had far reaching and effectively uncontrollable administrative authority.

The case of the Philippine military again highlighted the systematic intermingling of private and public interests and their connection via informal and disjointed rules of social obligations just as in the case of the religious organizations in Indonesia and the communist party in Vietnam; it should be identified as the central element of corrupt processes in south East Asia.

In her inquiries Heidi Mendoza also regularly found a large degree of acceptance amongst the lower ranks for the private embezzling attempts of their superiors. At the same time certain material outlays are expected from them vis-à-vis their ranks that they could under no circumstances shoulder by solely legal means. Accusations of corruption usually arise only when someone did not properly interpret and respect the (unwritten) rules of distribution, analogous to the Vietnamese "transaction costs".

Heidi Mendoza was adamant about the enormous waste of resources and the threat to the proper functioning of weapons and other gear under these circumstances.

A special role in this was played by the wives of the soldiers and officers; apart from the reproductive role in the family they acted as business partners, facilitators, career enhancers and as a social nexus between public function and its conversion for private benefit. Seemingly harmless social events such as invitations, receptions, parties and travels allowed the building of parallel networks.

Heidi Mendoza expressed the hope that the ingenuity of the Philippine military in diverting resources would be matched by the ingenuity of the governmental anti-corruption fighters, but she did not conceal her frustration about the fact that genuinely positive social impulses were distorted and perverted by corruption.

6.

Teten Masduki, the most prominent and persistent of Indonesia's anticorruption fighters started by saying how important it was to him to learn and think anew every day about the phenomenon of corruption.

An appreciation for the underlying mechanisms was crucial for every intervention and action, but especially in Indonesia the corruption scene had been dramatically altered in the course of the political changes of the last years: Under Suharto, until 1998 corruption had been centralized to benefit the government and had been quasi monarchically organized; it was only the "democratization of corruption" that had caused its proliferation and spread.

On top of that corruption had always found new targets in line with economic development and change: natural resources in the 1980s, government contracts and bank loans in the 1990s and nowadays the tax system and the federal budget.

Accordingly, corruption had entered campaign- and party-financing and finally parliament; old patronage-clientele-relationships now led to the usage of corrupt monies within the new democratic process. At the same time old patterns of corruption within the bureaucracy were multiplying. Decentralization also led more to a strengthening of local elites rather than improved participation of the population in the political process and had thus opened up new avenues for corruption.

Under these circumstances it seemed improbable that a governmental institution could be successful with an anti-corruption campaign from within. Generally the mainstream anti-corruption strategy was interpreting corruption too much as the result of the failure of governmental institution and not as a far more prominent and general societal phenomenon. International

donors also were putting too much emphasis on institutional reform instead of a strengthening of civil society. With stronger pressure from outside it seemed to make more sense despite widespread apathy and acceptance to broach the issue of these newer forms of corruption in Indonesia and fight them together with the media.

The efforts of Indonesia Corruption Watch to form alliances in schools between teachers, pupils and parents to tackle the endemic corruption in schools were a positive example in that direction.

Speakers

Prof. Azyumardi Azra was born on March 4th 1955 in West Sumatra. He graduated from the Faculty of Tarbiyah (Islamic Education) at IAIN in 1982, and obtained his MA (1989), MPhil (1990), and PhD (1992) at Columbia University. In May 2005, he was awarded the Doctoral Degree Honoris Causa in Humane Letters from Carroll College, Montana. He is an international visiting fellow at, among others, Oxford University, University of the Philippines, New York University, Columbia University and University of Melbourne. In 1993, he founded Studia Islamika; an Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies, at which he holds the position of the chief editor until today. He also serves at the advisory board of the Journal of Qur´anic Studies, SOAS, London. He has published books as well as numerous articles on Islamic Studies and Reforms. At present, Prof Azra is the Rector of IAIN/UIN Jakarta.

Prof. Dr. Syed Hussein Alatas was born in 1928. In 1963 he obtained his PhD in Political and Social Sciences from the University of Amsterdam. He has held numerous academic posts, serving e.g. as Professor and Head of Department of Malay Studies at NUS, as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Malaya and currently as Principal Research Fellow at the Institute of the Malay World and Civilization at the National University, Malaysia. His research interests range from the sociology of corruption – his first publication on that theme was published in 1968 – to modernization, the role of intellectuals and Islam in South East Asia.

Mr. Waluyo was born on December 16th 1956 in Klaten. He finished his undergraduate study in Mechanical Engineering at Trisaksi University, Jakarta, in 1988. In 1996, he received his Master Degree in Business Administration from Prasetiya Mulya Business School. Since 2004 he serves as a deputy of prevention at the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission. Before holding his present position, he was working in a multinational company with a multitude of assignments from 1975 until 2004. Mr. Waluyo is affiliated also with Transparency International and the Indonesian Petroleum Association.

Dr. Thaveeporn Vasavakul received her B.A. in International Relations from the Department of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, in 1982 and her PhD from the Department of Government, Cornell University in 1993. She served as a post-doctoral fellow at the Australian National University from 1994 to 1997. Between 1998 and 2002, she worked as Director of the Council of International Educational Exchange's Vietnam Program in Hanoi. She also taught South East Asian Politics in her capacity as visiting Professor at various universities in the US and Australia, including the University of Michigan, the University of California in Los Angeles, Yale and the ANU. Dr. Thaveeporn Vasavakul is currently a researcher affiliated with the Institute of Vietnamese Studies and Development Sciences in Hanoi. Since 2002, she has also been working as a governance consultant.

Ms. Heidi Mendoza is a Certified Public Accountant with a Master Degrees in National Security Administration (2003) and in Public Administration (1996). She served the Philippine Government for 20 years in the fields of audit, investigation, fraud examination, anti-corruption, and integrity as well as advocacy. Since 2004 she is working for The Office of The Ombudsman with tasks including assisting Corruption Prevention Programs, coordinating activities with anti-corruption groups towards government-private partnership in fighting against corruption, and training of prosecutors. Her fields of interest are audit and investigative accounting.

Mr. Teten Masduki, was born in 1963 and started his professional career in 1986 as a researcher for The Institute for Human Rights Studies and Information. From 1989 to 1994 he was actively involved in labor movements. In

1996, he was appointed as (the) coordinator of the Consortium for Labor Renewal and as (the) coordinator of Indonesian Corruption Watch in 1998. He holds this position until today. In addition, he is a member of the board of The Voice of Human Rights Foundation and National Ombudsman. Mr. Teten Masduki received the award Star of Asian from Business Week in 2004 and The Ramon Magsaysay Award for Public Service in 2005.

Dr. Peter J. Bumke studied Southeast Asian Studies in Munich, Freiburg, Heidelberg and Yale/USA, from 1964-1970, and finished them in 1970 with his Dr. Phil. He served in a Research Project in Thailand (1970-1973) and from 1973 to 1979 as Lecturer in Social Anthropology in Berlin. After two years as Rural Extension Officer for the FAO in Jamaica, he became an Adult Educationist in Munich (1983-1985). 1985, after an In-Service Training he started his career at Goethe-Institut, Munich. From 1989 to 1996, he was Director of the Goethe-Institut in Hyderabad, India. After holding the position as Deputy Director of the Program Department at the Goethe-Institut Head office in Munich for 3 years, he has been Director of the Goethe-Institut Jakarta, Indonesia, and Regional Director for South East Asia, Australia and New Zealand since 1999.

Participants Round Table Bangkok

Nguyen Tuan Anh

Head of Information Division
Government Inspectorate Research Institute
Vietnam

☑ nguyen.tuananh@giri.ac.vn

York Bendix

Sombat Benjasirimongkol

Engineer Thailand

Dr. Peter Bumke

Tanida Chiravachradej

Deputy Director GTZ Office Bangkok Thailand Imagtz-thailand@gtz.de

Darman CZ

Translator Indonesia

Prof. Dr. Nguyen Dinh Cu

Director
Institute for Population and Social Studies
National Economic University
Vietnam

☑ cund@neu.edu.vn

Prof. Dr. Bui The Cuong

Director

Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities HCMC (VASS)

Vietnam

™ cuongbuithe@yahoo.com

Prof. Dr. Le Dang Doanh

Adviser to the Minister of Planning and Investment (MPI)

Vietnam

™ le.dang.doanh@undp.org

Wilfried Eckstein

Director

Goethe-Institut Bangkok

Thailand

Eckstein@bangkok.goethe.org

Gamawan Fauzi

Governor of West-Sumatra

Indonesia

™ gubernur@sumbarprov.go.id

™ amawan_fauzi@plasa.com

Dr. Vu Quoc Huy

Deputy Director

Institute for Economic and Development Studies

National Economic University

Vietnam

™ vuhuy@hn.vnn.vn

Peter Janssen

Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA)

Deutschland

Chindapan Kheopan

Civil Servant Office Nontaburi

Thailand

Amornsak Kitthanana

Analyst

Thailand

Jürgen Koch

Director

GTZ Office Bangkok

Thailand

™ juergen.koch@gtz.de

Philip Kolo

Adviser

GTZ Office Hanoi

Vietnam

™ kolo.gtzvn@gtz-vietnam.com.vn

Le Van Lan

Project Management Board "Study, Struggle for Anti-Embezzlement" Central Department of the Interior Vietnam

☑ banqldatw@hn.vnn.vn

Prof. Dr. Trinh Duy Luan

Director

Vietnamese Academy for Social Sciences VASS

Hanoi

Vietnam

☑ luantd@hn.vnn.vn

Khunying Jaruvan Maintaka

General-Auditor

Thailand

Prof. Dr. Boonsri Mewongukote

Professor of Law Thammasat University

Thailand

Dr. Michael Nelson

Visiting Scholar Faculty of Political Science Chulalongkorn University Thailand

Thanachot Pairoh

Head of Foreign Affairs Section of NCCC Thailand

Nithiphan Prachuabmoh

Officer NCCC

Thailand

Prof. Dr. M. Bambang Pranowo

Professor for Anthropology/Sociology of Religion

State Islamic University-Jakarta

Indonesia

bpranowo@lycos.com

Dr. Günter Riethmacher

Country Director

GTZ Office Hanoi

Vietnam

™ Guenter.Riethmacher@gtz.de

Peter Rimmele

GTZ Office Jakarta

Indonesia

™ peter.rimmele@gtz.de

Dr. Lars Peter Schmidt

Director

Office Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Bangkok

Thailand

™ office@kasthailand.org

Dr. Buranaj Smutharaks

Member of Parliament Bangkok

Thailand

buranaj@prinitycorp.com

Somphot Somboon

Social Development Consultant

Thailand

Ruth Streicher

Free University Berlin

Deutschland

Inara Stuerckow

Adviser

Goethe-Institut Bangkok

Thailand

Warin Sukcharoen

Office of the Civil Service Commission Thailand

Prof. Dr. Kasian Tejapira

Thamassat University Bangkok Thailand ☐ kasian@alpha.tu.ac.th

Dr. Thaveeporn Vasavakul

Consultant

Researcher affiliated with Institute of Vietnamese Studies and Development Sciences Thailand

the thaveeporn@mail.kvsinter.com

Dr. Achana Vutthisomboon

Social Development Officer NCCC Thailand

Dr. Gerhard Will

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Berlin Germany ☑ gerhard.will@swp-berlin.org

Johanes Danang Widojoko

Vice Coordinator
Indonesian Corruption Watch
Indonesia

☑ icw@antikorupsi.org

Dr. Jörg Wischermann

Consultant
Research Associate
Free University Berlin
Germany

☑ joergwisch@yahoo.com

Participants Round Table Jakarta

Aang Abubakar

Research and Regional Officer Islamic State University

Arif Nur Alam

Prof. Syed Hussein Alata

Principal Research Fellow Institute of Malay World and Civilization (ATMA) Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

Prof. Dr. Azyumardi Azra

Rector

Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta

™ azyumardiazra@yahoo.com

Dr. Peter Bumke

Director Goethe Institute Jakarta Regional Director GI SE-Asia/AUS/NZ

H.S. Dillon

Former Director Partnership for Governance Reform UNDP

Daniel Dhakidae

Head of Research Division Kompas

Dr. Meuthia Ganie-Rochman

Researcher

Department of Sociology

Faculty of Social and Politics

University of Indonesia

™ rachwan@indo.net.id

Karlina Helmanita

Program Coordinator

Mainstreaming Anti-Corruption Education
Centre of Language and Culture
Islamic State University

Novita Ikasari

Project Coordinator

Dr. Birgit Kerstan

GTZ

birgit_kerstan@gmx.net

Alex Kesper

GTZ

Marco Kusumawijaya

Wella Madjid

VoA

Jakarta

Timer Manurung

Telepak Foundation

Sabine Markert

Teten Masduki

Coordinator

Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW)

™ tmasduki@yahoo.com

™ icwmail@indosat.net.id

Dr. B. May

Senior Decentralization Policy Advisor GTZ Advisory Service Support for Decentralisation (ASSD) Project Depdagri

MAYB@aol.com

Heidi Mendoza

Auditor V

Commission on Audit

Philippines

™ heidi_mendoza@yahoo.com

Dr. Urip A. Mokoginta

Institute of Applied Psychology University of Indonesia

Dr. J.M. Muslimin

Program Officer

Mainstreaming Anti-Corruption Education
Centre of Language and Culture
Islamic State University

R. Nadeswaran

Deputy Editor

The Sun Daily

Malaysia

™ citizen-nades@thesundaily.com

Prof. Dr. Aloysius Agus Nugroho

Faculty of Administrative Science

Catholic University of Atma Jaya

™ agus.nugroho@atmajaya.ac.id

Orinton

Civic Education and Budget Transparency Advocacy (CIBA)

Dr. Hana R. Panggabean

Faculty of Psychology

Catholic University of Atma Jaya

Peter Rimmele

Senior Advisor for Governance Reform

GTZ Support for Good Governance (SfGG) Project

Jakarta

™ rimmele@gtzsfgg.or.id

Peter.Rimmele@gtz.de

Rinusu

Civic Education and Budget Transparency Advocacy (CIBA)

Rohidin

Pusat Telaah dan Informasi Regional (Pattiro)

Dr. Anish Kumar Roy

Director Bureau for Resources Developement

The ASEAN Secretariat

André Scholz

German Embassy

Jakarta

Christina Schott

Journalist

Dr. Kamanto Sunarto

Researcher

Department of Sociology

Faculty of Social and Political Science

University of Indonesia

Riza Tadjoedin

Deputy County Director GTZ Indonesia

Pramono Tonthowy

Anti Corruption Movement Team PP Muhammadiyah

Dr. Thaveeporn Vasavakul

Researcher

Institute of Vietnamese Studies and Development Studies Hanoi

Maril Thaveeporn@mail.kvsinter.com


Waluyo

Prevention Deputy
Indonesian Corruption Erradication Comission (KPK)

Johanes Danang Widojoko

Vice-Coordinator Indonesian Corruption Watch

☑ icw@antikorupsi.org



Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH

GTZ Office Hanoi 6th floor, Hanoi Towers 49 Hai Ba Trung Street Hanoi, Vietnam Tel. :(+84) 493 449 51

Fax : (+84) 493 449 50 E-mail : gtz-vietnam@gtz.de Website : www.gtz.de/vietnam