Principal-Agent-Problems in Irrigation - Revision history

Jana Herold at 10:56, 5 February 2013

2013-02-05T10:56:43Z

Jana Herold at 13:36, 24 January 2013

2013-01-24T13:36:53Z

Jana Herold: moved "Prinicpal-Agent"-Problems in Irrigation to Principal-Agent-Problems in Irrigation

2013-01-24T13:36:25Z

moved "Prinicpal-Agent"-Problems in Irrigation to Principal-Agent-Problems in Irrigation

Irena Irmler at 00:28, 19 January 2013

2013-01-19T00:28:17Z

Jana Herold: Created page with "{{Publication |Pub Title="Prinicpal-Agent"-Problems in Irrigation |Pub Subtitle=Inviting Rentseeking and Corruption |Pub Author=Huppert, W., Wolff, B. |Pub Editor=Journal for App..."

2013-01-18T11:48:26Z

Created page with "{{Publication |Pub Title="Prinicpal-Agent"-Problems in Irrigation |Pub Subtitle=Inviting Rentseeking and Corruption |Pub Author=Huppert, W., Wolff, B. |Pub Editor=Journal for App..."

New page

{{Publication
|Pub Title="Prinicpal-Agent"-Problems in Irrigation
|Pub Subtitle=Inviting Rentseeking and Corruption
|Pub Author=Huppert, W., Wolff, B.
|Pub Editor=Journal for Applied Irrigation Science, Vol. 37, No.2, October, pp.179-198
|Pub Year=2002
|Pub Keywords=irrigation, irrigation management, corruption, rentseeking, governance, moral hazard, coping strategies
|Pub Type=publication
|Pub Language=English
|Pub TOC=1. Introduction

2. Motivation and coordination - key factors in system design

3. Principal-agent problems, corruption and rentseeking

4. Moral hazard problems

5. "Hold-up" problems

6. Adverse selection

7. Summary and outlook

References
|Pub Abstract=Efficiency deficits in irrigation management are endemic in many countries. Conventional approaches to raising the level of performance of irrigation schemes focus on improvements to the technical, financial and/or organizational capacities of the irrigation agency and - more importantly – of the water users. Such approaches often overlook a number of significant problems which cause inefficiencies in the first place. These problems relate to the fact that efficiency deficits may well be in the interests of most of the influential stakeholders involved. Since problems of this kind may emerge both in systems administered by a state agency and in farmer managed irrigation systems, it is essential to focus more attention on their analysis and prevention. The paper addresses the so-called “principal-agent” problems, which are a major factor in this context. Such problems are specific deficiencies related to the contracts and agreements between the partners of an exchange relationship. After presenting their essential characteristics, examples are provided from the irrigation sector. Finally, coping strategies are highlighted.
|Pub Permission=I have read the Terms and Conditions and hereby accept them.
|Pub Category=Enabling Environment
}}
{{Publication File Upload
|Pub File=Zeitschrift für Bewässerungswirtschaft, Huppert, W., Wolff, B. (2002) Principal-Agent-Problems in Irrigation-Inviting Rentseeking and Corruption.pdf
}}

@@ Line 6: / Line 6: @@
 |Pub Year=2002
 |Pub Keywords=irrigation, irrigation management, corruption, rentseeking, governance, moral hazard, coping strategies
 |Pub Type=publication
 |Pub Language=English

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{Publication
-|Pub Title="Principal-Agent"-Problems in Irrigation
+|Pub Title=Principal-Agent-Problems in Irrigation
 |Pub Subtitle=Inviting Rentseeking and Corruption
 |Pub Author=Huppert, W., Wolff, B.