Rent seeking in irrigated agriculture - Revision history

Irena Irmler at 11:36, 28 March 2013

2013-03-28T11:36:06Z

Jana Herold at 11:08, 5 February 2013

2013-02-05T11:08:28Z

Jana Herold at 11:08, 5 February 2013

2013-02-05T11:08:17Z

Jana Herold at 16:47, 10 January 2013

2013-01-10T16:47:30Z

Irena Irmler: Created page with "{{Publication |Pub Title=Rent seeking in irrigated agriculture |Pub Subtitle=Institutional problem areas in operation and maintenance |Pub Author=Renger, J., Wolff, B. |Pub ..."

2013-01-08T16:13:56Z

Created page with "{{Publication |Pub Title=Rent seeking in irrigated agriculture |Pub Subtitle=Institutional problem areas in operation and maintenance |Pub Author=Renger, J., Wolff, B. |Pub ..."

New page

{{Publication
|Pub Title=Rent seeking in irrigated agriculture
|Pub Subtitle=Institutional problem areas in operation and maintenance
|Pub Author=Renger, J., Wolff, B.
|Pub Editor=GIZ
|Pub Year=2000
|Pub Keywords=irrigated agriculture; rent seeking; corruption; service provision
|Pub Type=publication
|Pub Language=English
|Pub Abstract=The goal of this paper is to raise awareness of the problem of rent seeking and show ways for irrigated agriculture to meet its development policy objectives better. The paper is an attempt to examine irrigated agriculture from the standpoint of the new institutional economics. The core idea of this (still relatively young) theory is to interpret and explain the behaviour of individuals and groups in terms of political and administrative systems. This does not mean that the personal characteristics of the actors would be irrelevant. However, if we take an “average” actor, there are clear relationships between the structures in the environment within which they act and their behaviour. By configuring such structures, it is possible to direct the behaviour of the people operating within them. The structures and rules of the system not only determine people’s scope for action but also the relative individual benefit of the various alternative actions for the actor concerned.
|Pub Permission=I have read the Terms and Conditions and hereby accept them.
|Pub Category=Enabling Environment
}}
{{Publication File Upload
|Pub File=GIZ, Renger, J., Wolff, B. (2000) Rent seeking in irrigated agriculture.pdf
}}

@@ Line 9: / Line 9: @@
 |Pub Type=publication
 |Pub Language=English
-|Pub TOC=1. Introction: A new view of irrigation management
+|Pub TOC=1. Introduction: A new view of irrigation management
 . Rent seeking: striving for profit from transfers

@@ Line 22: / Line 22: @@
 References
-|Pub Abstract=The goal of this paper is to raise awareness of the problem of rent seeking and show ways for irrigated agriculture to meet its development policy objectives better. The paper is an attempt to examine irrigated agriculture from the standpoint of the new institutional economics. The core idea of this (still relatively young) theory is to interpret and explain the behaviour of individuals and groups in terms of political and administrative systems. This does not mean that the personal characteristics of the actors would be irrelevant. However, if we take an “average” actor, there are clear relationships between the structures in the environment within which they act and their behaviour. By configuring such structures, it is possible to direct the behaviour of the people operating within them. The structures and rules of the system not only determine people’s scope for action but also the relative individual benefit of the various alternative actions for the actor concerned.
+|Pub Abstract=The goal of this paper is to raise awareness of the problem of rent seeking and show ways for irrigated agriculture to meet its development policy objectives better. The paper is an attempt to examine irrigated agriculture from the standpoint of the new institutional economics. The core idea of this (still relatively young) theory is to interpret and explain the behaviour of individuals and groups in terms of political and administrative systems. This does not mean that the personal characteristics of the actors would be irrelevant. However, if we take an “average” actor, there are clear relationships between the structures in the environment within which they act and their behaviour. By configuring such structures, it is possible to direct the behaviour of the people operating within them. The structures and rules of the system not only determine people’s scope for action but also the relative individual benefit of the various alternative actions for the actor concerned. To introduce this discussion, the paper first gives a general overview of the phenomenon of rent seeking. The focus here is on the distinct functional logic of social, political and economic systems which lead to rent seeking. With this foundation the paper then looks for examples of rent seeking in irrigated agriculture in developing countries. The emphasis here is on the question which individual goals the various actors are pursuing through (!) rather than in irrigated agriculture.
 |Pub Permission=I have read the Terms and Conditions and hereby accept them.
 |Pub Category=Enabling Environment

@@ Line 5: / Line 5: @@
 |Pub Editor=GIZ
 |Pub Year=2000
-|Pub Keywords=irrigated agriculture, rent seeking, corruption, service provision
+|Pub Keywords=irrigated agriculture, irrigation management, rent seeking, corruption, service provision
 |Pub Type=publication
 |Pub Language=English
 |Pub Abstract=The goal of this paper is to raise awareness of the problem of rent seeking and show ways for irrigated agriculture to meet its development policy objectives better. The paper is an attempt to examine irrigated agriculture from the standpoint of the new institutional economics. The core idea of this (still relatively young) theory is to interpret and explain the behaviour of individuals and groups in terms of political and administrative systems. This does not mean that the personal characteristics of the actors would be irrelevant. However, if we take an “average” actor, there are clear relationships between the structures in the environment within which they act and their behaviour. By configuring such structures, it is possible to direct the behaviour of the people operating within them. The structures and rules of the system not only determine people’s scope for action but also the relative individual benefit of the various alternative actions for the actor concerned.
 |Pub Permission=I have read the Terms and Conditions and hereby accept them.

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{Publication
 |Pub Title=Rent seeking in irrigated agriculture
 |Pub Subtitle=Institutional problem areas in operation and maintenance
 |Pub Author=Renger, J., Wolff, B.
 |Pub Editor=GIZ
 |Pub Year=2000
-|Pub Keywords=irrigated agriculture; rent seeking; corruption; service provision
+|Pub Keywords=irrigated agriculture, rent seeking, corruption, service provision
 |Pub Type=publication
 |Pub Language=English