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| Line 9: |
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| | |Pub Type=publication | | |Pub Type=publication |
| | |Pub Language=English | | |Pub Language=English |
| | + | |Pub TOC=1. Irrigation and water use in the Jordan Valley |
| | + | |
| | + | 2. Operation and Maintenance |
| | + | |
| | + | 3. The "Principal-Agent" perspective - looking at O&M from a different angle |
| | + | |
| | + | 4. Water delivery and O&M of the Secondary System |
| | + | |
| | + | 5. Financing Operation and Maintenance Services |
| | + | |
| | + | 6. Legal Insecurity |
| | + | |
| | + | 7. Toward a solution of Principal-Agent problems in Jordan Valley Irrigation |
| | + | |
| | + | 8. Conclusion |
| | + | |
| | + | References |
| | |Pub Abstract=This paper, which draws on discussions with JVA in 1998, does not aim at reflecting the actual situation of JVA. Instead, referring to the Situation of 1998, it seeks to illustrate how concepts of "Principal-Agent theory", as described in the previous paper, may be applied in practical cases. The paper analyses the institutions for water allocation, water delivery and maintenance in the Jordan Valley irrigation system and explicitly points to specific areas where potential principal-agent problems may deserve attention. The article refers to the governance debate in the papers of this journal, and shows that in most cases the governance mechanisms for water allocation, water delivery and maintenance in the Jordan Valley irrigation were either deficient or altogether non-existent. Unsurprisingly, the main actors, JVA staff and farmers, had little incentive to change the rules of the game- indeed, it may actually be in their best interests to maintain the system's existing inefficiencies | | |Pub Abstract=This paper, which draws on discussions with JVA in 1998, does not aim at reflecting the actual situation of JVA. Instead, referring to the Situation of 1998, it seeks to illustrate how concepts of "Principal-Agent theory", as described in the previous paper, may be applied in practical cases. The paper analyses the institutions for water allocation, water delivery and maintenance in the Jordan Valley irrigation system and explicitly points to specific areas where potential principal-agent problems may deserve attention. The article refers to the governance debate in the papers of this journal, and shows that in most cases the governance mechanisms for water allocation, water delivery and maintenance in the Jordan Valley irrigation were either deficient or altogether non-existent. Unsurprisingly, the main actors, JVA staff and farmers, had little incentive to change the rules of the game- indeed, it may actually be in their best interests to maintain the system's existing inefficiencies |
| | |Pub Permission=I have read the Terms and Conditions and hereby accept them. | | |Pub Permission=I have read the Terms and Conditions and hereby accept them. |
| Title
|
Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley
|
| Subtitle
|
The neglected Issue of Principal-Agent Problems
|
| Author
|
Huppert, W., Urban, K.
|
| Editor or Organisation
|
Journal of Applied Irrigation Science, Vol. 37, No. 2/2002, pp.199-218
|
| Year
|
2002
|
| Keywords
|
economics, governance, irrigation, water management, institutions, principal-agent theory
|
| Country
|
Jordan
|
| Type
|
publication
|
| Language
|
English
|
| Table of Contents
|
1. Irrigation and water use in the Jordan Valley
2. Operation and Maintenance
3. The "Principal-Agent" perspective - looking at O&M from a different angle
4. Water delivery and O&M of the Secondary System
5. Financing Operation and Maintenance Services
6. Legal Insecurity
7. Toward a solution of Principal-Agent problems in Jordan Valley Irrigation
8. Conclusion
References
|
| Abstract
|
This paper, which draws on discussions with JVA in 1998, does not aim at reflecting the actual situation of JVA. Instead, referring to the Situation of 1998, it seeks to illustrate how concepts of "Principal-Agent theory", as described in the previous paper, may be applied in practical cases. The paper analyses the institutions for water allocation, water delivery and maintenance in the Jordan Valley irrigation system and explicitly points to specific areas where potential principal-agent problems may deserve attention. The article refers to the governance debate in the papers of this journal, and shows that in most cases the governance mechanisms for water allocation, water delivery and maintenance in the Jordan Valley irrigation were either deficient or altogether non-existent. Unsurprisingly, the main actors, JVA staff and farmers, had little incentive to change the rules of the game- indeed, it may actually be in their best interests to maintain the system's existing inefficiencies
|
| Permission
|
Yes
|
| Category
|
Economics, Enabling environment
|
| File
|
|
