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| − | Water User Associations (WUAs) are self-governed organisations of farmers who pool their financial, technical and human resources for the use and maintenance of a defined watershed, including irrigation agriculture, livestock production and fisheries. WUA members can range from small-scale or peasant farmers, e.g. in India, to large commercial farmers, e.g. in California (Preparation of Regulation for Irrigation Water Users’ Associations in Ethiopia, 20??). For policy-makers, planners and technical experts, WUA forms a conceptual and institutional tool to transfer water management from a higher political level to the actual users of water resources for agricultural production. This bottom-up organisational form of water governance aims to lead to “effective, comprehensive, integrated and sustainable” reform in water management in order to enhance perceived gaps in irrigation performance (Transfer of Irrigation Management Services Guidelines).
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| − | = Description and origins of WUAs =
| + | Water User Associations (WUAs) are self-governed organisations of farmers who pool their financial, technical and human resources for the use and maintenance of a defined watershed, including irrigation agriculture, livestock production and fisheries. WUA members can range from small-scale or peasant farmers, e.g. in India, to large commercial farmers, e.g. in California (Preparation of Regulation for Irrigation Water Users’ Associations in Ethiopia, 20??). For policy-makers, planners and technical experts, WUA forms a conceptual and institutional tool to transfer water management from a higher political level to the actual users of water resources for agricultural production. This bottom-up organisational form of water governance aims to lead to “effective, comprehensive, integrated and sustainable” reform in water management in order to enhance perceived gaps in irrigation performance (Transfer of Irrigation Management Services Guidelines). |
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| − | The establishment of WUAs mark “a transfer of responsibilities and authority from the political level (government agencies) to non-governmental organisations” (Transfer of Irrigation Management Services Guidelines 1999). WUAs manage water at the lowest level in a participatory and democratic manner (see table below), where the users of water, namely farmers, can elect leaders, collect water fees, implement maintenance and resolve potential conflicts over water use internally. It marks an alternative to other organisational forms governed by either the public or private sector.
| + | = Description and origins of WUAs = |
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| − | The organisational concept was first introduced by Elinor Ostrom et al. in “Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources” (1994) to propose how to govern scarce resources at the lowest level of decision making and use. In the development sector, the WUA concept has found widespread acceptance amongst many leading organisations involved in water governance strategies, such as GIZ, FAO, IWMI, and the World Bank, in order to effectively govern water resources pressurised by climate change and over-allocation. Results from the field have shown that if water users themselves directly decide the use of water, the performance of irrigation schemes increases, thus providing social and economic incentives to farmers to manage water more effectively (see section 3). | + | The establishment of WUAs mark “a transfer of responsibilities and authority from the political level (government agencies) to non-governmental organisations” (Transfer of Irrigation Management Services Guidelines 1999). WUAs manage water at the lowest level in a participatory and democratic manner (see table below), where the users of water, namely farmers, can elect leaders, collect water fees, implement maintenance and resolve potential conflicts over water use internally. It marks an alternative to other organisational forms governed by either the public or private sector. |
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| − | WUAs have been implemented in various countries across the world. Each country’s needs and prerequisites must be thoroughly assessed before the first phase is launched. The social fabric of each country must be considered with great care. For example, the establishment processes of WUAs in African countries around small dams such as Burkina Faso were specifically designed to promote a pro-gender approach (PEBASO 2003). In addition, environmental analyses of water availability, the application of agronomic tools such as crop water requirements, and analyses of soil structures must play a pivotal role in the advisory services provided to the executing authorities that establish WUAs (Guideline on Irrigation Agronomy 2011).
| + | The organisational concept was first introduced by Elinor Ostrom et al. in “Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources” (1994) to propose how to govern scarce resources at the lowest level of decision making and use. In the development sector, the WUA concept has found widespread acceptance amongst many leading organisations involved in water governance strategies, such as GIZ, FAO, IWMI, and the World Bank, in order to effectively govern water resources pressurised by climate change and over-allocation. Results from the field have shown that if water users themselves directly decide the use of water, the performance of irrigation schemes increases, thus providing social and economic incentives to farmers to manage water more effectively (see section 3). |
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| − | A wide range of water user organisations has existed for centuries across the world, governed by a variety of legal facets. Today, traditional legal governance forms of watershed management pose particularly significant challenges to modern forms of WUAs due to the collision of customary law application with that of modern law (Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources Management Directorate 2011). The challenges and risks of modern adaptations of WUAs in developing countries such as Ethiopia will be outlined in section 4.
| + | WUAs have been implemented in various countries across the world. Each country’s needs and prerequisites must be thoroughly assessed before the first phase is launched. The social fabric of each country must be considered with great care. For example, the establishment processes of WUAs in African countries around small dams such as Burkina Faso were specifically designed to promote a pro-gender approach (PEBASO 2003). In addition, environmental analyses of water availability, the application of agronomic tools such as crop water requirements, and analyses of soil structures must play a pivotal role in the advisory services provided to the executing authorities that establish WUAs (Guideline on Irrigation Agronomy 2011). |
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| − | <br>Type of Organisation Governance Source of financing Management capacity<br>Public utility o board of directors from line agencies and regional govts.
| + | A wide range of water user organisations has existed for centuries across the world, governed by a variety of legal facets. Today, traditional legal governance forms of watershed management pose particularly significant challenges to modern forms of WUAs due to the collision of customary law application with that of modern law (Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources Management Directorate 2011). The challenges and risks of modern adaptations of WUAs in developing countries such as Ethiopia will be outlined in section 4. |
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| − | *heavily regulated o primarily water charges, possibly some subsidy | + | <br/>Type of Organisation Governance Source of financing Management capacity<br/>Public utility o board of directors from line agencies and regional govts. |
| − | *specialised and professional | + | *heavily regulated o primarily water charges, possibly some subsidy |
| | + | *specialised and professional |
| | *can handle large scale complex tasks | | *can handle large scale complex tasks |
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| − | | + | <br/>Local government o responsible to local or state govt. |
| − | | + | *land taxes and other local govt. revenues |
| − | Local government o responsible to local or state govt. | + | |
| − | | + | |
| − | *land taxes and other local govt. revenues | + | |
| | *limited due to multiple roles, may rely on contracting | | *limited due to multiple roles, may rely on contracting |
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| − |
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| − | Irrigation district o WUA elects board of directors
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| − | *some govt. oversight o water charges, secondary revenue | + | Irrigation district o WUA elects board of directors |
| − | *possible subsidies o moderate to sophisticated | + | *some govt. oversight o water charges, secondary revenue |
| | + | *possible subsidies o moderate to sophisticated |
| | *can handle medium to large scale, with technical guidance | | *can handle medium to large scale, with technical guidance |
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| − | <br>Mutual company o land and water rights shareholders elect board of directors | + | <br/>Mutual company o land and water rights shareholders elect board of directors |
| − | | + | *little govt. regulation |
| − | *little govt. regulation | + | *water charges |
| − | *water charges | + | |
| | *secondary revenue, may be profit-making entity o generally suitable for small to moderate scale | | *secondary revenue, may be profit-making entity o generally suitable for small to moderate scale |
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| − |
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| − |
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| − | Private company o owners or shareholders
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| − |
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| − | *little govt. regulation o water charges or other profits of business
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| − | *scale limited by size of capitalisation of company
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| − | <br>
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| − | Contractor o agreement with sponsor organisation
| + | Private company o owners or shareholders |
| | + | *little govt. regulation o water charges or other profits of business |
| | + | *scale limited by size of capitalisation of company<br/> |
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| − | *paid by sponsoring organisation | + | Contractor o agreement with sponsor organisation |
| − | *can be specialised and professional | + | *paid by sponsoring organisation |
| | + | *can be specialised and professional |
| | *scale limited by size and company | | *scale limited by size and company |
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| − | <br>Water User Association o representatives elected by members | + | <br/>Water User Association o representatives elected by members |
| − | | + | *water charges or land tax |
| − | *water charges or land tax | + | |
| | *small scale where direct management by users is possible | | *small scale where direct management by users is possible |
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| − | (Source: Transfer of Irrigation Management Services 1999, p, 41) | + | (Source: Transfer of Irrigation Management Services 1999, p, 41) |
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| − | <br>
| + | = GIZ approach = |
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| | + | GIZ has actively engaged in the international debate in the development sector to promote the application of WUAs in developing countries. As a result, four phases have been identified for the successful development of WUAs. |
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| − | = GIZ approach =
| + | (Source: GTZ Topic Sheet: Water User Associations) |
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| − | GIZ has actively engaged in the international debate in the development sector to promote the application of WUAs in developing countries. As a result, four phases have been identified for the successful development of WUAs.
| + | <br/>'''Phase 1''' begins with an analysis of the existing performance gaps in an irrigation scheme, followed by a sensitive solicitation of government support for a transfer of responsibilities from a government institution to a non-governmental WUA. This phase is also called “confidence building among all stakeholders”, which can range from members of government to farmers. If all stakeholders can be convinced,<br/>'''Phase 2''' is the establishment of the institutional settings. Commissions, representational of all stakeholders, are advised on how the strategic reform can be coordinated. As in Phase 1, there is a need for the technical advisors to apply constant consensus building methods throughout the establishment of WUAs. During this process stakeholders meet and discuss together the required changes in workshops, seminars and other meetings. Stakeholders also meet and discuss with political decision makers, as well as convey their local knowledge to the involved external technical advisors from GIZ.<br/>'''Phase 3''' addresses crucial policy and legal issues for a successful implementation of WUAs. First, government subsidies must be gradually reduced until they are eliminated. The goal is for water users to pay for their own water usage without costly government subsidies distorting the actual price of water. Secondly, legal changes are mandatory as WUAs face severe challenges when confronting strong government bureaucracies and powerful local governments if they have no formal water rights. Implementation of necessary legal amendments are a pre-requisite for the successful establishment of WUAs. Finally, the organisational form of the new WUA is addressed to guarantee the accountability of service provision. From the earliest stages of a WUA, all stakeholders are included in each step to foster trust and transparency.<br/>Finally, in '''Phase 4''' a plan is drawn up for implementation of the WUA: capacity building; assistance with hydrological data; legal advice; and planning, design, construction and financing of technological improvement projects, such as better irrigation technology (FAO, GTZ and IWMI 1999). |
| − | | + | |
| − | (Source: GTZ Topic Sheet: Water User Associations)
| + | |
| − | | + | |
| − | <br>'''Phase 1''' begins with an analysis of the existing performance gaps in an irrigation scheme, followed by a sensitive solicitation of government support for a transfer of responsibilities from a government institution to a non-governmental WUA. This phase is also called “confidence building among all stakeholders”, which can range from members of government to farmers. If all stakeholders can be convinced,<br>'''Phase 2''' is the establishment of the institutional settings. Commissions, representational of all stakeholders, are advised on how the strategic reform can be coordinated. As in Phase 1, there is a need for the technical advisors to apply constant consensus building methods throughout the establishment of WUAs. During this process stakeholders meet and discuss together the required changes in workshops, seminars and other meetings. Stakeholders also meet and discuss with political decision makers, as well as convey their local knowledge to the involved external technical advisors from GIZ. <br>'''Phase 3''' addresses crucial policy and legal issues for a successful implementation of WUAs. First, government subsidies must be gradually reduced until they are eliminated. The goal is for water users to pay for their own water usage without costly government subsidies distorting the actual price of water. Secondly, legal changes are mandatory as WUAs face severe challenges when confronting strong government bureaucracies and powerful local governments if they have no formal water rights. Implementation of necessary legal amendments are a pre-requisite for the successful establishment of WUAs. Finally, the organisational form of the new WUA is addressed to guarantee the accountability of service provision. From the earliest stages of a WUA, all stakeholders are included in each step to foster trust and transparency. <br>Finally, in '''Phase 4''' a plan is drawn up for implementation of the WUA: capacity building; assistance with hydrological data; legal advice; and planning, design, construction and financing of technological improvement projects, such as better irrigation technology (FAO, GTZ and IWMI 1999). | + | |
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| | GIZ advises the devolution of water management powers in various countries across the world, e.g. Jordan, Egypt, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. | | GIZ advises the devolution of water management powers in various countries across the world, e.g. Jordan, Egypt, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. |
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| | + | <br/> |
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| − | = Good practice example from Jordan = | + | = Good practice example from Jordan = |
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| − | The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of the most water-impoverished economies in the world. With an annual per capita availability of less than 150m3 of internally renewable water resources, the country falls dramatically below the water poverty line of 1000m3 per capita/year. Water efficiency therefore plays a major role in meeting the demands of future socio-economic development in the Kingdom. Jordan is a country with long experience in irrigation agriculture. The 1950s and 1970s saw a substantial expansion of irrigation agriculture to meet population growth. However, over the following decades, maintenance problems occurred due to an unclear distribution of executive powers (GTZ, IFPRI and IWMI 2001). | + | The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of the most water-impoverished economies in the world. With an annual per capita availability of less than 150m3 of internally renewable water resources, the country falls dramatically below the water poverty line of 1000m3 per capita/year. Water efficiency therefore plays a major role in meeting the demands of future socio-economic development in the Kingdom. Jordan is a country with long experience in irrigation agriculture. The 1950s and 1970s saw a substantial expansion of irrigation agriculture to meet population growth. However, over the following decades, maintenance problems occurred due to an unclear distribution of executive powers (GTZ, IFPRI and IWMI 2001). |
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| − | The Jordan Valley irrigation schemes suffered from poor water efficiency in the 1990s. Despite a technological upgrade from surface irrigation to drip irrigation, no real water efficiency gains were made, and irrigation cost recovery was not achieved (Huppert and Urban, 2002). Moreover, the irrigation systems leaked significant amounts of water as a result of inadequate maintenance. In 2001, the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation decided to work with GIZ on an implementation strategy of WUAs in the Jordan Valley (see map below). It was projected that the water provision services in the Jordan Valley would positively benefit from a transfer of irrigation management services from the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) to WUAs. The aim was to enable the participation of farmers in decision-making processes over water usage and maintenance of existing system in order to increase water efficiency, reduce leakages and thus achieve cost recovery of water resources for the Jordanian government. | + | The Jordan Valley irrigation schemes suffered from poor water efficiency in the 1990s. Despite a technological upgrade from surface irrigation to drip irrigation, no real water efficiency gains were made, and irrigation cost recovery was not achieved (Huppert and Urban, 2002). Moreover, the irrigation systems leaked significant amounts of water as a result of inadequate maintenance. In 2001, the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation decided to work with GIZ on an implementation strategy of WUAs in the Jordan Valley (see map below). It was projected that the water provision services in the Jordan Valley would positively benefit from a transfer of irrigation management services from the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) to WUAs. The aim was to enable the participation of farmers in decision-making processes over water usage and maintenance of existing system in order to increase water efficiency, reduce leakages and thus achieve cost recovery of water resources for the Jordanian government. |
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| − | Since the introduction of WUAs, the scarce water available in the Jordan Valley is being used more efficiently in irrigated farming, and farmers are showing greater acceptance to pay water fees for cost recovery of services. Water leakages have also decreased due to the adequate maintenance of irrigation systems by WUAs. For example, in the Al Kafrein area in the Jordan Valley, the daily water use decreased by 50% from 12.000 m3/day to 6.000 cm3/day (WUAs in the Jordan Valley 2010). Around 30% of the farmers in the Jordan Valley have been trained in the use of treated wastewater for irrigation according to environmental and health standards (see Management of Water Resources Programme in Jordan website). | + | Since the introduction of WUAs, the scarce water available in the Jordan Valley is being used more efficiently in irrigated farming, and farmers are showing greater acceptance to pay water fees for cost recovery of services. Water leakages have also decreased due to the adequate maintenance of irrigation systems by WUAs. For example, in the Al Kafrein area in the Jordan Valley, the daily water use decreased by 50% from 12.000 m3/day to 6.000 cm3/day (WUAs in the Jordan Valley 2010). Around 30% of the farmers in the Jordan Valley have been trained in the use of treated wastewater for irrigation according to environmental and health standards (see Management of Water Resources Programme in Jordan website). |
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| − | <br> | + | <br/> |
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| − | = Risks and challenges = | + | = Risks and challenges = |
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| − | The project in Jordan has faced many difficulties since its establishment. Mistrust and resistance of farmers, in particular those with large land holdings, has caused continuous challenges over the years. In addition, technical difficulties occurred due to water shortages and a worn out distribution network. These challenges were addressed through the promotion of open dialogue and full transparency, in order to encourage farmers to work on joint solutions which would include and convince all farmers. The technical problems were addressed by timely technical support and information provision on best practices in agriculture. | + | The project in Jordan has faced many difficulties since its establishment. Mistrust and resistance of farmers, in particular those with large land holdings, has caused continuous challenges over the years. In addition, technical difficulties occurred due to water shortages and a worn out distribution network. These challenges were addressed through the promotion of open dialogue and full transparency, in order to encourage farmers to work on joint solutions which would include and convince all farmers. The technical problems were addressed by timely technical support and information provision on best practices in agriculture. |
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| − | As indicated earlier, WUAs have a long tradition in many parts of the world. However, examples from Egypt and Ethiopia show that successful implementation of WUAs may face severe challenges: lack of autonomy or customary law, and inapt capacity development. Thus, the successful establishment of WUAs depend on all stakeholders involved. | + | As indicated earlier, WUAs have a long tradition in many parts of the world. However, examples from Egypt and Ethiopia show that successful implementation of WUAs may face severe challenges: lack of autonomy or customary law, and inapt capacity development. Thus, the successful establishment of WUAs depend on all stakeholders involved. |
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| − | In Egypt, the autonomy of self-governed WUAs overlaps with the responsibilities of local government and agricultural cooperatives. This overlay has caused significant constraints for the mandate of WUAs. Although WUAs have formally gained the required status of self-governing institutions, the “rules of the game” are greatly impacted by agricultural cooperatives and local government. While local government in Egypt is responsible for development plans, is it the agricultural cooperatives which provide inputs such as fertilisers, direct and control agricultural production, and purchase the produce at fixed prices from the farmers to sell on to the consumer. Both the local governments and agricultural cooperatives are controlled by the central government; hence an interference on the farm level may constrain the independent development of WUAs, e.g. decisions on cropping or expansion of irrigation schemes (Egyptian-German Water Resources Management Reform Programme – Comparison between Local Administration, Agricultural Cooperatives and Water User Organisations 2010). Farmer surveys undertaken in Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira (2010) have illustrated that further devolution of resource management via local government and cooperatives is one of the current obstacles to the success of WUAs. | + | In Egypt, the autonomy of self-governed WUAs overlaps with the responsibilities of local government and agricultural cooperatives. This overlay has caused significant constraints for the mandate of WUAs. Although WUAs have formally gained the required status of self-governing institutions, the “rules of the game” are greatly impacted by agricultural cooperatives and local government. While local government in Egypt is responsible for development plans, is it the agricultural cooperatives which provide inputs such as fertilisers, direct and control agricultural production, and purchase the produce at fixed prices from the farmers to sell on to the consumer. Both the local governments and agricultural cooperatives are controlled by the central government; hence an interference on the farm level may constrain the independent development of WUAs, e.g. decisions on cropping or expansion of irrigation schemes (Egyptian-German Water Resources Management Reform Programme – Comparison between Local Administration, Agricultural Cooperatives and Water User Organisations 2010). Farmer surveys undertaken in Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira (2010) have illustrated that further devolution of resource management via local government and cooperatives is one of the current obstacles to the success of WUAs. |
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| − | Farmers in Ethiopia, on the other hand, are used to customary law that has often led to an over-allocation of water resources because decisions….. Irrigation is a relatively new concept in Ethiopia, a country where an estimated 132 billion cm of water is potentially available for human use. However, the upgrading from rainfed farming to small scale irrigation has served to embed the challenge of water over-usage in irrigation, thus negatively affects cropping and soils (Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources Management Directorate 2011). | + | Farmers in Ethiopia, on the other hand, are used to customary law that has often led to an over-allocation of water resources because decisions….. Irrigation is a relatively new concept in Ethiopia, a country where an estimated 132 billion cm of water is potentially available for human use. However, the upgrading from rainfed farming to small scale irrigation has served to embed the challenge of water over-usage in irrigation, thus negatively affects cropping and soils (Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources Management Directorate 2011). |
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| − | = References = | + | = References = |
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| − | Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit and International Water Management Institute. 1999. Transfer of Management Services Guidelines. FAO: Rome. | + | Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit and International Water Management Institute. 1999. Transfer of Management Services Guidelines. FAO: Rome. |
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| − | [[:File:Water User Associations Jordan.pdf|Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). 2010. Topic Sheet: German-Jordanian Programme – Management of Water Resources: Water Users’ Associations. Eschborn: GTZ.]] | + | [[:File:Water User Associations Jordan.pdf|Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). 2010. Topic Sheet: German-Jordanian Programme – Management of Water Resources: Water Users’ Associations. Eschborn: GTZ.]] |
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| − | German-Egyptian Water Resource Management Reform Programme. 2010. Comparison between Local Administration, Agricultural Cooperatives, and Water User Organisations. Cairo: GIZ. | + | German-Egyptian Water Resource Management Reform Programme. 2010. Comparison between Local Administration, Agricultural Cooperatives, and Water User Organisations. Cairo: GIZ. |
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| − | [[:File:Governing Maintenance Provision in Irrigation GTZ 2011.pdf|Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, International Food Policy Research Institute and International Water Management Institute. 2001. Governing Maintenance Provision in Irrigation: A Guide to Institutionally Viable Maintenance Strategies. Wiesbaden: GTZ.]] | + | [[Governing_Maintenance_Provision|Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, International Food Policy Research Institute and International Water Management Institute. 2001. Governing Maintenance Provision in Irrigation: A Guide to Institutionally Viable Maintenance Strategies. Wiesbaden: GTZ.]] |
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| − | German-Egyptian Water Resource Management Reform Programme. 2010. Benefits of Collective Action: Cases of Collective Action from Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira. Cairo: GIZ. | + | German-Egyptian Water Resource Management Reform Programme. 2010. Benefits of Collective Action: Cases of Collective Action from Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira. Cairo: GIZ. |
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| − | German-Jordanian Programme on Management of Water Resources. 2010. Water User Associations: the story of participative irrigation management in the Jordan Valley. Amman: GIZ. | + | German-Jordanian Programme on Management of Water Resources. 2010. Water User Associations: the story of participative irrigation management in the Jordan Valley. Amman: GIZ. |
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| − | [[:File:Small scale irrigation capacity building strategy for Ethiopia.pdf|Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources Management Directorate. 2011. Small-Scale Irrigation Situation Analysis and Capacity Needs Assessment - A Tripartite Cooperation between Germany, Israel and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: GIZ.]] | + | [[:File:Small scale irrigation capacity building strategy for Ethiopia.pdf|Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources Management Directorate. 2011. Small-Scale Irrigation Situation Analysis and Capacity Needs Assessment - A Tripartite Cooperation between Germany, Israel and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: GIZ.]] |
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| − | [[:File:Guideline on Irrigation agronomy.pdf|Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resource Sector. 2011. Guideline on Irrigation Agronomy - A Tripartite Cooperation between Germany, Israel and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: GIZ.]] | + | [[:File:Guideline on Irrigation agronomy.pdf|Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resource Sector. 2011. Guideline on Irrigation Agronomy - A Tripartite Cooperation between Germany, Israel and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: GIZ.]] |
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| − | Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l’Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques a Burkina Faso. Projet “Petits Barrages du Sud-Ouest" (PEBASO). Ouagadougou: GTZ. | + | Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l’Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques a Burkina Faso. Projet “Petits Barrages du Sud-Ouest" (PEBASO). Ouagadougou: GTZ. |
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| − | Preparation of Regulation for Irrigation Water Users Associations. 20??. Summary. Addis Ababa: GIZ. | + | Preparation of Regulation for Irrigation Water Users Associations. 20??. Summary. Addis Ababa: GIZ. |
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| − | [[:File:Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley - The neglected Issue of Principal-Agent Problems - Huppert 2002.pdf|Walter Huppert and Klaus Urban. 2002. Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley – The neglected issue of “Principal-Agent” problems. In: Journal of Applied Irrigation Science, Vol. 37, No. 2/2002, p. 199-218.]] | + | [[:File:Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley - The neglected Issue of Principal-Agent Problems - Huppert 2002.pdf|Walter Huppert and Klaus Urban. 2002. Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley – The neglected issue of “Principal-Agent” problems. In: Journal of Applied Irrigation Science, Vol. 37, No. 2/2002, p. 199-218.]] |
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| | Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and James Walker (editors). 1994. Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. | | Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and James Walker (editors). 1994. Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press. |
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| − | = Links = | + | = Links = |
| − | | + | |
| − | http://www.giz.de/Themen/en/SID-F4FDBADA-0F4FA304/28265.htm
| + | |
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| − | http://www.giz.de/en/SID-B4AA3102-17B130F0/downloads/Irrigation_in_Ethiopia.pdf | + | [http://www.giz.de/Themen/en/SID-F4FDBADA-0F4FA304/28265.htm http://www.giz.de/Themen/en/SID-F4FDBADA-0F4FA304/28265.htm] |
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| − | http://www.giz.de/Themen/de/SID-60F06B12-D5FA38DC/dokumente/gtz2010-en-water-resources-jordan.pdf | + | [http://www.giz.de/en/SID-B4AA3102-17B130F0/downloads/Irrigation_in_Ethiopia.pdf http://www.giz.de/en/SID-B4AA3102-17B130F0/downloads/Irrigation_in_Ethiopia.pdf] |
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| − | http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/319.html | + | [http://www.giz.de/Themen/de/SID-60F06B12-D5FA38DC/dokumente/gtz2010-en-water-resources-jordan.pdf http://www.giz.de/Themen/de/SID-60F06B12-D5FA38DC/dokumente/gtz2010-en-water-resources-jordan.pdf] |
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| − | <br>
| + | [http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/319.html http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/319.html] |
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| + | <br/> |
Water User Associations (WUAs) are self-governed organisations of farmers who pool their financial, technical and human resources for the use and maintenance of a defined watershed, including irrigation agriculture, livestock production and fisheries. WUA members can range from small-scale or peasant farmers, e.g. in India, to large commercial farmers, e.g. in California (Preparation of Regulation for Irrigation Water Users’ Associations in Ethiopia, 20??). For policy-makers, planners and technical experts, WUA forms a conceptual and institutional tool to transfer water management from a higher political level to the actual users of water resources for agricultural production. This bottom-up organisational form of water governance aims to lead to “effective, comprehensive, integrated and sustainable” reform in water management in order to enhance perceived gaps in irrigation performance (Transfer of Irrigation Management Services Guidelines).
The establishment of WUAs mark “a transfer of responsibilities and authority from the political level (government agencies) to non-governmental organisations” (Transfer of Irrigation Management Services Guidelines 1999). WUAs manage water at the lowest level in a participatory and democratic manner (see table below), where the users of water, namely farmers, can elect leaders, collect water fees, implement maintenance and resolve potential conflicts over water use internally. It marks an alternative to other organisational forms governed by either the public or private sector.
The organisational concept was first introduced by Elinor Ostrom et al. in “Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources” (1994) to propose how to govern scarce resources at the lowest level of decision making and use. In the development sector, the WUA concept has found widespread acceptance amongst many leading organisations involved in water governance strategies, such as GIZ, FAO, IWMI, and the World Bank, in order to effectively govern water resources pressurised by climate change and over-allocation. Results from the field have shown that if water users themselves directly decide the use of water, the performance of irrigation schemes increases, thus providing social and economic incentives to farmers to manage water more effectively (see section 3).
WUAs have been implemented in various countries across the world. Each country’s needs and prerequisites must be thoroughly assessed before the first phase is launched. The social fabric of each country must be considered with great care. For example, the establishment processes of WUAs in African countries around small dams such as Burkina Faso were specifically designed to promote a pro-gender approach (PEBASO 2003). In addition, environmental analyses of water availability, the application of agronomic tools such as crop water requirements, and analyses of soil structures must play a pivotal role in the advisory services provided to the executing authorities that establish WUAs (Guideline on Irrigation Agronomy 2011).
A wide range of water user organisations has existed for centuries across the world, governed by a variety of legal facets. Today, traditional legal governance forms of watershed management pose particularly significant challenges to modern forms of WUAs due to the collision of customary law application with that of modern law (Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources Management Directorate 2011). The challenges and risks of modern adaptations of WUAs in developing countries such as Ethiopia will be outlined in section 4.
GIZ has actively engaged in the international debate in the development sector to promote the application of WUAs in developing countries. As a result, four phases have been identified for the successful development of WUAs.
GIZ advises the devolution of water management powers in various countries across the world, e.g. Jordan, Egypt, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of the most water-impoverished economies in the world. With an annual per capita availability of less than 150m3 of internally renewable water resources, the country falls dramatically below the water poverty line of 1000m3 per capita/year. Water efficiency therefore plays a major role in meeting the demands of future socio-economic development in the Kingdom. Jordan is a country with long experience in irrigation agriculture. The 1950s and 1970s saw a substantial expansion of irrigation agriculture to meet population growth. However, over the following decades, maintenance problems occurred due to an unclear distribution of executive powers (GTZ, IFPRI and IWMI 2001).
The Jordan Valley irrigation schemes suffered from poor water efficiency in the 1990s. Despite a technological upgrade from surface irrigation to drip irrigation, no real water efficiency gains were made, and irrigation cost recovery was not achieved (Huppert and Urban, 2002). Moreover, the irrigation systems leaked significant amounts of water as a result of inadequate maintenance. In 2001, the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation decided to work with GIZ on an implementation strategy of WUAs in the Jordan Valley (see map below). It was projected that the water provision services in the Jordan Valley would positively benefit from a transfer of irrigation management services from the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) to WUAs. The aim was to enable the participation of farmers in decision-making processes over water usage and maintenance of existing system in order to increase water efficiency, reduce leakages and thus achieve cost recovery of water resources for the Jordanian government.
Since the introduction of WUAs, the scarce water available in the Jordan Valley is being used more efficiently in irrigated farming, and farmers are showing greater acceptance to pay water fees for cost recovery of services. Water leakages have also decreased due to the adequate maintenance of irrigation systems by WUAs. For example, in the Al Kafrein area in the Jordan Valley, the daily water use decreased by 50% from 12.000 m3/day to 6.000 cm3/day (WUAs in the Jordan Valley 2010). Around 30% of the farmers in the Jordan Valley have been trained in the use of treated wastewater for irrigation according to environmental and health standards (see Management of Water Resources Programme in Jordan website).
The project in Jordan has faced many difficulties since its establishment. Mistrust and resistance of farmers, in particular those with large land holdings, has caused continuous challenges over the years. In addition, technical difficulties occurred due to water shortages and a worn out distribution network. These challenges were addressed through the promotion of open dialogue and full transparency, in order to encourage farmers to work on joint solutions which would include and convince all farmers. The technical problems were addressed by timely technical support and information provision on best practices in agriculture.
As indicated earlier, WUAs have a long tradition in many parts of the world. However, examples from Egypt and Ethiopia show that successful implementation of WUAs may face severe challenges: lack of autonomy or customary law, and inapt capacity development. Thus, the successful establishment of WUAs depend on all stakeholders involved.
In Egypt, the autonomy of self-governed WUAs overlaps with the responsibilities of local government and agricultural cooperatives. This overlay has caused significant constraints for the mandate of WUAs. Although WUAs have formally gained the required status of self-governing institutions, the “rules of the game” are greatly impacted by agricultural cooperatives and local government. While local government in Egypt is responsible for development plans, is it the agricultural cooperatives which provide inputs such as fertilisers, direct and control agricultural production, and purchase the produce at fixed prices from the farmers to sell on to the consumer. Both the local governments and agricultural cooperatives are controlled by the central government; hence an interference on the farm level may constrain the independent development of WUAs, e.g. decisions on cropping or expansion of irrigation schemes (Egyptian-German Water Resources Management Reform Programme – Comparison between Local Administration, Agricultural Cooperatives and Water User Organisations 2010). Farmer surveys undertaken in Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira (2010) have illustrated that further devolution of resource management via local government and cooperatives is one of the current obstacles to the success of WUAs.
Farmers in Ethiopia, on the other hand, are used to customary law that has often led to an over-allocation of water resources because decisions….. Irrigation is a relatively new concept in Ethiopia, a country where an estimated 132 billion cm of water is potentially available for human use. However, the upgrading from rainfed farming to small scale irrigation has served to embed the challenge of water over-usage in irrigation, thus negatively affects cropping and soils (Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources Management Directorate 2011).
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit and International Water Management Institute. 1999. Transfer of Management Services Guidelines. FAO: Rome.
German-Egyptian Water Resource Management Reform Programme. 2010. Comparison between Local Administration, Agricultural Cooperatives, and Water User Organisations. Cairo: GIZ.
German-Egyptian Water Resource Management Reform Programme. 2010. Benefits of Collective Action: Cases of Collective Action from Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira. Cairo: GIZ.
German-Jordanian Programme on Management of Water Resources. 2010. Water User Associations: the story of participative irrigation management in the Jordan Valley. Amman: GIZ.
Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l’Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques a Burkina Faso. Projet “Petits Barrages du Sud-Ouest" (PEBASO). Ouagadougou: GTZ.
Preparation of Regulation for Irrigation Water Users Associations. 20??. Summary. Addis Ababa: GIZ.
Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner and James Walker (editors). 1994. Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
