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| Title
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"Principal-Agent"-Problems in Irrigation
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| Subtitle
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Inviting Rentseeking and Corruption
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| Author
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Huppert, W., Wolff, B.
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| Editor or Organisation
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Journal for Applied Irrigation Science, Vol. 37, No.2, October, pp.179-198
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| Year
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2002
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| Keywords
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irrigation, irrigation management, corruption, rentseeking, governance, moral hazard, coping strategies
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| Country
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| Type
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publication
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| Language
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English
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| Table of Contents
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1. Introduction
2. Motivation and coordination - key factors in system design
3. Principal-agent problems, corruption and rentseeking
4. Moral hazard problems
5. "Hold-up" problems
6. Adverse selection
7. Summary and outlook
References
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| Abstract
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Efficiency deficits in irrigation management are endemic in many countries. Conventional approaches to raising the level of performance of irrigation schemes focus on improvements to the technical, financial and/or organizational capacities of the irrigation agency and - more importantly – of the water users. Such approaches often overlook a number of significant problems which cause inefficiencies in the first place. These problems relate to the fact that efficiency deficits may well be in the interests of most of the influential stakeholders involved. Since problems of this kind may emerge both in systems administered by a state agency and in farmer managed irrigation systems, it is essential to focus more attention on their analysis and prevention. The paper addresses the so-called “principal-agent” problems, which are a major factor in this context. Such problems are specific deficiencies related to the contracts and agreements between the partners of an exchange relationship. After presenting their essential characteristics, examples are provided from the irrigation sector. Finally, coping strategies are highlighted.
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| Permission
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Yes
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| Category
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Enabling Environment
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| File
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