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| | The establishment of WUAs marks “a transfer of responsibilities and authority from the political level (government agencies) to non-governmental organisations”.<ref name="FAO">Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit and International Water Management Institute (1999): Transfer of Management Services Guidelines. FAO: Rome.</ref> WUAs manage water at the lowest level in a participatory and democratic manner (see table below), where the users of water, namely farmers, can elect leaders, collect water fees, implement maintenance and resolve potential conflicts over water use internally. It marks an alternative to other organisational forms governed by either the public or private sector. | | The establishment of WUAs marks “a transfer of responsibilities and authority from the political level (government agencies) to non-governmental organisations”.<ref name="FAO">Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit and International Water Management Institute (1999): Transfer of Management Services Guidelines. FAO: Rome.</ref> WUAs manage water at the lowest level in a participatory and democratic manner (see table below), where the users of water, namely farmers, can elect leaders, collect water fees, implement maintenance and resolve potential conflicts over water use internally. It marks an alternative to other organisational forms governed by either the public or private sector. |
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| − | The organisational concept was first introduced by Elinor Ostrom et al. in “Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources” (1994) to propose how to govern scarce resources at the lowest level of decision making and use.<ref name="Ostrom">Ostrom, Elinor, Gardner, Roy and Walker, James (editors) (1994): Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.</ref> In the development sector, the WUA concept has found widespread acceptance amongst many leading organisations involved in water governance strategies, such as GIZ, FAO, IWMI, and the World Bank, in order to effectively govern water resources pressurised by climate change and over-allocation. Results from the field have shown that if water users themselves directly decide the use of water, the performance of irrigation schemes increases, thus providing social and economic incentives to farmers to manage water more effectively (see section 3). | + | The organisational concept was first introduced by Elinor Ostrom et al. in “Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources” (1994) to propose how to govern scarce resources at the lowest level of decision making and use.<ref name="Ostrom">Ostrom, Elinor, Gardner, Roy and Walker, James (editors) (1994): Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.</ref> In the development sector, the WUA concept has found widespread acceptance amongst many leading organisations involved in water governance strategies, such as GIZ, FAO, IWMI, and the World Bank, in order to effectively govern water resources pressurised by climate change and over-[[Water_Development_and_Allocation|allocation]]. Results from the field have shown that if water users themselves directly decide the use of water, the performance of irrigation schemes increases, thus providing social and economic incentives to farmers to manage water more effectively (see section 3). |
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| − | WUAs have been implemented in various countries across the world. Each country’s needs and prerequisites must be thoroughly assessed before the first phase is launched. The social fabric of each country must be considered with great care. For example, the establishment processes of WUAs in African countries around small dams such as Burkina Faso were specifically designed to promote a pro-gender approach.<ref name="PEBASO">Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l’Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques a Burkina Faso (2003): Projet “Petits Barrages du Sud-Ouest" (PEBASO). Ouagadougou: GTZ.</ref> In addition, environmental analyses of water availability, the application of agronomic tools such as crop water requirements, and analyses of soil structures must play a pivotal role in the advisory services provided to the executing authorities that establish WUAs.<ref name="Ministry">Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resource Sector (2011): Guideline on Irrigation Agronomy - A Tripartite Cooperation between Germany, Israel and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: GIZ.</ref> | + | WUAs have been implemented in various countries across the world. Each country’s needs and prerequisites must be thoroughly assessed before the first phase is launched. The social fabric of each country must be considered with great care. For example, the establishment processes of WUAs in African countries around small dams such as Burkina Faso were specifically designed to promote a pro-[[Water Governance and Women|gender]] approach.<ref name="PEBASO">Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l’Hydraulique et des Ressources Halieutiques a Burkina Faso (2003): Projet “Petits Barrages du Sud-Ouest" (PEBASO). Ouagadougou: GTZ.</ref> In addition, environmental analyses of water availability, the application of agronomic tools such as crop water requirements, and analyses of soil structures must play a pivotal role in the advisory services provided to the executing authorities that establish WUAs.<ref name="Ministry">Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resource Sector (2011): Guideline on Irrigation Agronomy - A Tripartite Cooperation between Germany, Israel and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: GIZ.</ref> |
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| | A wide range of water user organisations has existed for centuries across the world, governed by a variety of legal facets. Today, traditional legal governance forms of watershed management pose particularly significant challenges to modern forms of WUAs due to the collision of customary law application with that of modern law.<ref name="Directorate">Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources Management Directorate (2011): Small-Scale Irrigation Situation Analysis and Capacity Needs Assessment - A Tripartite Cooperation between Germany, Israel and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: GIZ.</ref>The challenges and risks of modern adaptations of WUAs in developing countries such as Ethiopia will be outlined in section 4. | | A wide range of water user organisations has existed for centuries across the world, governed by a variety of legal facets. Today, traditional legal governance forms of watershed management pose particularly significant challenges to modern forms of WUAs due to the collision of customary law application with that of modern law.<ref name="Directorate">Ministry of Agriculture Natural Resources Management Directorate (2011): Small-Scale Irrigation Situation Analysis and Capacity Needs Assessment - A Tripartite Cooperation between Germany, Israel and Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: GIZ.</ref>The challenges and risks of modern adaptations of WUAs in developing countries such as Ethiopia will be outlined in section 4. |
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| − | {| style="width: 773px;" border="1" cellspacing="1" cellpadding="5" | + | {| cellspacing="1" cellpadding="5" border="1" style="width: 773px" |
| | |- | | |- |
| | | | | | |
| | '''Type of organisation''' | | '''Type of organisation''' |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 215px;" | | + | | style="width: 215px" | |
| | '''Governance''' | | '''Governance''' |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 209px;" | | + | | style="width: 209px" | |
| | '''Source of financing''' | | '''Source of financing''' |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 231px;" | | + | | style="width: 231px" | |
| | '''Managin capacity''' | | '''Managin capacity''' |
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| | '''Public utility''' | | '''Public utility''' |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 215px;" | | + | | style="width: 215px" | |
| | *board of directors from line agencies and regional govts. | | *board of directors from line agencies and regional govts. |
| | *heavily regulated | | *heavily regulated |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 209px;" | | + | | style="width: 209px" | |
| | *primarily water charges, possibly some subsidy | | *primarily water charges, possibly some subsidy |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 231px;" | | + | | style="width: 231px" | |
| | *specialised and professional | | *specialised and professional |
| | *can handle large scale complex tasks | | *can handle large scale complex tasks |
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| | '''Local government''' | | '''Local government''' |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 215px;" | | + | | style="width: 215px" | |
| | *responsible to local or state govt. | | *responsible to local or state govt. |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 209px;" | | + | | style="width: 209px" | |
| | *land taxes and other local govt. revenues | | *land taxes and other local govt. revenues |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 231px;" | | + | | style="width: 231px" | |
| | *limited due to multiple roles, may rely on contracting | | *limited due to multiple roles, may rely on contracting |
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| | '''Irrigation district''' | | '''Irrigation district''' |
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| − | | style="width: 215px;" | | + | | style="width: 215px" | |
| | *WUA elects board of directors | | *WUA elects board of directors |
| | *some govt. oversight | | *some govt. oversight |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 209px;" | | + | | style="width: 209px" | |
| | *water charges, secondary revenue | | *water charges, secondary revenue |
| | *possible subsidies | | *possible subsidies |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 231px;" | | + | | style="width: 231px" | |
| | *moderate to sophisticated | | *moderate to sophisticated |
| | *can handle medium to large scale, with technical guidance | | *can handle medium to large scale, with technical guidance |
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| | '''Mutual company''' | | '''Mutual company''' |
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| − | | style="width: 215px;" | | + | | style="width: 215px" | |
| | *land and water rights shareholders elect board of directors | | *land and water rights shareholders elect board of directors |
| | *little govt. regulation | | *little govt. regulation |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 209px;" | | + | | style="width: 209px" | |
| | *water charges | | *water charges |
| | *secondary revenue, may be profit-making entity | | *secondary revenue, may be profit-making entity |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 231px;" | | + | | style="width: 231px" | |
| | *generally suitable for small to moderate scale | | *generally suitable for small to moderate scale |
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| | '''Private company''' | | '''Private company''' |
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| − | | style="width: 215px;" | | + | | style="width: 215px" | |
| | *owners or shareholders | | *owners or shareholders |
| | *little govt. regulation | | *little govt. regulation |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 209px;" | | + | | style="width: 209px" | |
| | *water charges or other profits of business | | *water charges or other profits of business |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 231px;" | | + | | style="width: 231px" | |
| | *scale limited by size of capitalisation of company | | *scale limited by size of capitalisation of company |
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| | '''Contractor''' | | '''Contractor''' |
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| − | | style="width: 215px;" | | + | | style="width: 215px" | |
| | *agreement with sponsor organisation | | *agreement with sponsor organisation |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 209px;" | | + | | style="width: 209px" | |
| | *paid by sponsoring organisation | | *paid by sponsoring organisation |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 231px;" | | + | | style="width: 231px" | |
| | *can be specialised and professional | | *can be specialised and professional |
| | *scale limited by size and company | | *scale limited by size and company |
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| | '''Water user association''' | | '''Water user association''' |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 215px;" | | + | | style="width: 215px" | |
| | *representatives elected by members | | *representatives elected by members |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 209px;" | | + | | style="width: 209px" | |
| | *water charges or land tax | | *water charges or land tax |
| | | | |
| − | | style="width: 231px;" | | + | | style="width: 231px" | |
| | *small scale where direct management by users is possible | | *small scale where direct management by users is possible |
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| | Source:FAO, GTZ and IWMI (1999) p.41.<ref name="FAO">Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit and International Water Management Institute (1999): Transfer of Management Services Guidelines. FAO: Rome.</ref> | | Source:FAO, GTZ and IWMI (1999) p.41.<ref name="FAO">Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit and International Water Management Institute (1999): Transfer of Management Services Guidelines. FAO: Rome.</ref> |
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| | + | <br/> |
| | | | |
| | = GIZ approach = | | = GIZ approach = |
| | | | |
| − | GIZ has actively engaged in the international debate in the development sector to promote the application of WUAs in developing countries. As a result, four phases have been identified for the successful development of WUAs.<ref name="GIZTS">Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (2010): Topic Sheet: German-Jordanian Programme – Management of Water Resources: Water Users’ Associations. Eschborn: GTZ. | + | GIZ has actively engaged in the [[International policy dialogue|international debate]] in the development sector to promote the application of WUAs in developing countries. As a result, four phases have been identified for the successful development of WUAs.<ref name="GIZTS">Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (2010): Topic Sheet: German-Jordanian Programme – Management of Water Resources: Water Users’ Associations. Eschborn: GTZ.fckLRhttp://star-www.giz.de/dokumente/bib-2010/gtz2010-3095en-water-user-associations-wua.pdffckLR[2013-02-18].</ref> |
| − | http://star-www.giz.de/dokumente/bib-2010/gtz2010-3095en-water-user-associations-wua.pdf
| + | |
| − | [2013-02-18].</ref> | + | |
| | | | |
| | [[File:GIZ Water User Associations.png|center|368px|alt=GIZ Water User Associations.png]] | | [[File:GIZ Water User Associations.png|center|368px|alt=GIZ Water User Associations.png]] |
| − | <p style="text-align: center;">Source: GTZ (2010)<ref name="GIZTS">Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (2010): Topic Sheet: German-Jordanian Programme – Management of Water Resources: Water Users’ Associations. Eschborn: GTZ. | + | <p style="text-align: center">Source: GTZ (2010)<ref name="GIZTS">Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) (2010): Topic Sheet: German-Jordanian Programme – Management of Water Resources: Water Users’ Associations. Eschborn: GTZ.fckLRhttp://star-www.giz.de/dokumente/bib-2010/gtz2010-3095en-water-user-associations-wua.pdffckLR[2013-02-18].</ref></p> |
| − | http://star-www.giz.de/dokumente/bib-2010/gtz2010-3095en-water-user-associations-wua.pdf
| + | |
| − | [2013-02-18].</ref></p> | + | |
| | *'''Phase 1''' begins with an analysis of the existing performance gaps in an irrigation scheme, followed by a sensitive solicitation of government support for a transfer of responsibilities from a government institution to a non-governmental WUA. This phase is also called “confidence building among all stakeholders”, which can range from members of government to farmers. If all stakeholders can be convinced, | | *'''Phase 1''' begins with an analysis of the existing performance gaps in an irrigation scheme, followed by a sensitive solicitation of government support for a transfer of responsibilities from a government institution to a non-governmental WUA. This phase is also called “confidence building among all stakeholders”, which can range from members of government to farmers. If all stakeholders can be convinced, |
| | *'''Phase 2''' is the establishment of the institutional settings. Commissions, representational of all stakeholders, are advised on how the strategic reform can be coordinated. As in Phase 1, there is a need for the technical advisors to apply constant consensus building methods throughout the establishment of WUAs. During this process stakeholders meet and discuss together the required changes in workshops, seminars and other meetings. Stakeholders also meet and discuss with political decision makers, as well as convey their local knowledge to the involved external technical advisors from GIZ. | | *'''Phase 2''' is the establishment of the institutional settings. Commissions, representational of all stakeholders, are advised on how the strategic reform can be coordinated. As in Phase 1, there is a need for the technical advisors to apply constant consensus building methods throughout the establishment of WUAs. During this process stakeholders meet and discuss together the required changes in workshops, seminars and other meetings. Stakeholders also meet and discuss with political decision makers, as well as convey their local knowledge to the involved external technical advisors from GIZ. |
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| | GIZ advises the devolution of water management powers in various countries across the world, e.g. Jordan, Egypt, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. | | GIZ advises the devolution of water management powers in various countries across the world, e.g. Jordan, Egypt, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso. |
| | | | |
| | + | <br/> |
| | | | |
| | = Good practice example from Jordan = | | = Good practice example from Jordan = |
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| | The Jordan Valley irrigation schemes suffered from poor water efficiency in the 1990s. Despite a technological upgrade from surface irrigation to drip irrigation, no real water efficiency gains were made, and irrigation cost recovery was not achieved.<ref name="Huppert">Huppert, Walter and Urban, Klaus (2002): Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley – The neglected issue of “Principal-Agent” problems. In: Journal of Applied Irrigation Science, Vol. 37, No. 2/2002, p. 199-218.</ref> Moreover, the irrigation systems leaked significant amounts of water as a result of inadequate maintenance. In 2001, the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation decided to work with GIZ on an implementation strategy of WUAs in the Jordan Valley (see map below). It was projected that the water provision services in the Jordan Valley would positively benefit from a transfer of irrigation management services from the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) to WUAs. The aim was to enable the participation of farmers in decision-making processes over water usage and maintenance of existing system in order to increase water efficiency, reduce leakages and thus achieve cost recovery of water resources for the Jordanian government. | | The Jordan Valley irrigation schemes suffered from poor water efficiency in the 1990s. Despite a technological upgrade from surface irrigation to drip irrigation, no real water efficiency gains were made, and irrigation cost recovery was not achieved.<ref name="Huppert">Huppert, Walter and Urban, Klaus (2002): Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley – The neglected issue of “Principal-Agent” problems. In: Journal of Applied Irrigation Science, Vol. 37, No. 2/2002, p. 199-218.</ref> Moreover, the irrigation systems leaked significant amounts of water as a result of inadequate maintenance. In 2001, the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation decided to work with GIZ on an implementation strategy of WUAs in the Jordan Valley (see map below). It was projected that the water provision services in the Jordan Valley would positively benefit from a transfer of irrigation management services from the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) to WUAs. The aim was to enable the participation of farmers in decision-making processes over water usage and maintenance of existing system in order to increase water efficiency, reduce leakages and thus achieve cost recovery of water resources for the Jordanian government. |
| | | | |
| − | Since the introduction of WUAs, the scarce water available in the Jordan Valley is being used more efficiently in irrigated farming, and farmers are showing greater acceptance to pay water fees for cost recovery of services. Water leakages have also decreased due to the adequate maintenance of irrigation systems by WUAs. For example, in the Al Kafrein area in the Jordan Valley, the daily water use decreased by 50% from 12.000 m<sup>3</sup>/day to 6.000 cm<sup>3</sup>/day.<ref name="WUA">German-Jordanian Programme on Management of Water Resources (2010): Water User Associations: the story of participative irrigation management in the Jordan Valley. Amman: GIZ.</ref> Around 30% of the farmers in the Jordan Valley have been trained in the use of treated wastewater for irrigation according to environmental and health standards (see Management of Water Resources Programme in Jordan website).<ref name="GIZ">GIZ Management of Water Resources Programme: http://www.giz.de/themen/en/18151.htm</ref> | + | Since the introduction of WUAs, the scarce water available in the Jordan Valley is being used more efficiently in irrigated farming, and farmers are showing greater acceptance to pay water fees for cost recovery of services. Water leakages have also decreased due to the adequate maintenance of irrigation systems by WUAs. For example, in the Al Kafrein area in the Jordan Valley, the daily water use decreased by 50% from 12.000 m<sup>3</sup>/day to 6.000 cm<sup>3</sup>/day.<ref name="WUA">German-Jordanian Programme on Management of Water Resources (2010): Water User Associations: the story of participative irrigation management in the Jordan Valley. Amman: GIZ.</ref> Around 30% of the farmers in the Jordan Valley have been trained in the use of treated wastewater for irrigation according to environmental and health standards (see Management of Water Resources Programme in Jordan website).<ref name="GIZ">GIZ Management of Water Resources Programme: http://www.giz.de/themen/en/18151.htm [2013-19-02].</ref> |
| | | | |
| | [[File:Geographical Distribution of WUAs.png|left|229px|alt=Geographical Distribution of WUAs.png]] | | [[File:Geographical Distribution of WUAs.png|left|229px|alt=Geographical Distribution of WUAs.png]] |
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| | <references /> | | <references /> |
| − |
| |
| | | | |
| | = Additional Information = | | = Additional Information = |
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| | [[:File:Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley - The neglected Issue of Principal-Agent Problems - Huppert 2002.pdf|Huppert, Walter and Urban, Klaus (2002):. Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley – The neglected issue of “Principal-Agent” problems. In: Journal of Applied Irrigation Science, Vol. 37, No. 2/2002, p. 199-218.]] | | [[:File:Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley - The neglected Issue of Principal-Agent Problems - Huppert 2002.pdf|Huppert, Walter and Urban, Klaus (2002):. Irrigation Management in the Jordan Valley – The neglected issue of “Principal-Agent” problems. In: Journal of Applied Irrigation Science, Vol. 37, No. 2/2002, p. 199-218.]] |
| | | | |
| − | GIZ in Egypt: [http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/319.html http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/319.html] [Accessed 2013-02-18]. | + | GIZ in Egypt: [http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/319.html http://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/319.html] [2013-02-18]. |
| | + | |
| | + | [[Category:Enabling_Environment]] |
| | + | [[Category:Excellent]] |
Water User Associations (WUAs) are self-governed organisations of farmers who pool their financial, technical and human resources for the use and maintenance of a defined watershed, including irrigation agriculture, livestock production and fisheries. WUA members can range from small-scale or peasant farmers, e.g. in India, to large commercial farmers, e.g. in California.[1] For policy-makers, planners and technical experts, WUA forms a conceptual and institutional tool to transfer water management from a higher political level to the actual users of water resources for agricultural production. This bottom-up organisational form of water governance aims to lead to “effective, comprehensive, integrated and sustainable” reform in water management in order to enhance perceived gaps in irrigation performance.[2]
The establishment of WUAs marks “a transfer of responsibilities and authority from the political level (government agencies) to non-governmental organisations”.[2] WUAs manage water at the lowest level in a participatory and democratic manner (see table below), where the users of water, namely farmers, can elect leaders, collect water fees, implement maintenance and resolve potential conflicts over water use internally. It marks an alternative to other organisational forms governed by either the public or private sector.
The organisational concept was first introduced by Elinor Ostrom et al. in “Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources” (1994) to propose how to govern scarce resources at the lowest level of decision making and use.[3] In the development sector, the WUA concept has found widespread acceptance amongst many leading organisations involved in water governance strategies, such as GIZ, FAO, IWMI, and the World Bank, in order to effectively govern water resources pressurised by climate change and over-allocation. Results from the field have shown that if water users themselves directly decide the use of water, the performance of irrigation schemes increases, thus providing social and economic incentives to farmers to manage water more effectively (see section 3).
WUAs have been implemented in various countries across the world. Each country’s needs and prerequisites must be thoroughly assessed before the first phase is launched. The social fabric of each country must be considered with great care. For example, the establishment processes of WUAs in African countries around small dams such as Burkina Faso were specifically designed to promote a pro-gender approach.[4] In addition, environmental analyses of water availability, the application of agronomic tools such as crop water requirements, and analyses of soil structures must play a pivotal role in the advisory services provided to the executing authorities that establish WUAs.[5]
A wide range of water user organisations has existed for centuries across the world, governed by a variety of legal facets. Today, traditional legal governance forms of watershed management pose particularly significant challenges to modern forms of WUAs due to the collision of customary law application with that of modern law.[6]The challenges and risks of modern adaptations of WUAs in developing countries such as Ethiopia will be outlined in section 4.
GIZ advises the devolution of water management powers in various countries across the world, e.g. Jordan, Egypt, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso.
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of the most water-impoverished economies in the world. With an annual per capita availability of less than 150m3 of internally renewable water resources, the country falls dramatically below the water poverty line of 1000m3 per capita/year. Water efficiency therefore plays a major role in meeting the demands of future socio-economic development in the Kingdom. Jordan is a country with long experience in irrigation agriculture. The 1950s and 1970s saw a substantial expansion of irrigation agriculture to meet population growth. However, over the following decades, maintenance problems occurred due to an unclear distribution of executive powers.[8]
The Jordan Valley irrigation schemes suffered from poor water efficiency in the 1990s. Despite a technological upgrade from surface irrigation to drip irrigation, no real water efficiency gains were made, and irrigation cost recovery was not achieved.[9] Moreover, the irrigation systems leaked significant amounts of water as a result of inadequate maintenance. In 2001, the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation decided to work with GIZ on an implementation strategy of WUAs in the Jordan Valley (see map below). It was projected that the water provision services in the Jordan Valley would positively benefit from a transfer of irrigation management services from the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) to WUAs. The aim was to enable the participation of farmers in decision-making processes over water usage and maintenance of existing system in order to increase water efficiency, reduce leakages and thus achieve cost recovery of water resources for the Jordanian government.
Since the introduction of WUAs, the scarce water available in the Jordan Valley is being used more efficiently in irrigated farming, and farmers are showing greater acceptance to pay water fees for cost recovery of services. Water leakages have also decreased due to the adequate maintenance of irrigation systems by WUAs. For example, in the Al Kafrein area in the Jordan Valley, the daily water use decreased by 50% from 12.000 m3/day to 6.000 cm3/day.[10] Around 30% of the farmers in the Jordan Valley have been trained in the use of treated wastewater for irrigation according to environmental and health standards (see Management of Water Resources Programme in Jordan website).[11]
The project in Jordan has faced many difficulties since its establishment. Mistrust and resistance of farmers, in particular those with large land holdings, has caused continuous challenges over the years. In addition, technical difficulties occurred due to water shortages and a worn out distribution network. These challenges were addressed through the promotion of open dialogue and full transparency, in order to encourage farmers to work on joint solutions which would include and convince all farmers. The technical problems were addressed by timely technical support and information provision on best practices in agriculture.
As indicated earlier, WUAs have a long tradition in many parts of the world. However, examples from Egypt and Ethiopia show that successful implementation of WUAs may face severe challenges: lack of autonomy or customary law, and inapt capacity development. Thus, the successful establishment of WUAs depend on all stakeholders involved.
In Egypt, the autonomy of self-governed WUAs overlaps with the responsibilities of local government and agricultural cooperatives. This overlay has caused significant constraints for the mandate of WUAs. Although WUAs have formally gained the required status of self-governing institutions, the “rules of the game” are greatly impacted by agricultural cooperatives and local government. While local government in Egypt is responsible for development plans, is it the agricultural cooperatives which provide inputs such as fertilisers, direct and control agricultural production, and purchase the produce at fixed prices from the farmers to sell on to the consumer. Both the local governments and agricultural cooperatives are controlled by the central government; hence an interference on the farm level may constrain the independent development of WUAs, e.g. decisions on cropping or expansion of irrigation schemes.[12] Farmer surveys undertaken in Kafr El Sheikh and Beheira (2010) have illustrated that further devolution of resource management via local government and cooperatives is one of the current obstacles to the success of WUAs.[13]
Farmers in Ethiopia, on the other hand, are used to customary law that has often led to an over-allocation of water resources because decisions were made by more powerful traditional social actors. Irrigation is a relatively new concept in Ethiopia, a country where an estimated 132 billion cm of water is potentially available for human use. However, the upgrading from rainfed farming to small scale irrigation has served to embed the challenge of water over-usage in irrigation, thus negatively affects cropping and soils.[6]
